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Toward a Great Sioux Nation Judicial
Support Center and Supreme Court
An Interim Planning and Recommendation Report
for the Wakpa Sica Historical Society’s Reconciliation
Place Project

he report highlights the need for strengthening the existing tribal judicial systems in the project region as a necessary and highly desirable step toward establishing the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court.
Areas in which support are needed include access to legal research,
publication of tribal court opinions, the availability of “law clerks” for
conducting legal research, and increased training of tribal judges, clerks,
administrators, prosecutors, public defenders, and practicing counsel.
The report also provides a broad overview of legal issues facing tribal
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This Interim Planning and Recommendation Report describes the significance and potential benefits of the Wakpa
Sica Historical Society’s Reconciliation Place Project in its
endeavor to facilitate the establishment of a Great Sioux
Nation Supreme Court. The report emphasizes that the
vision of establishing such a Court has existed among the
Sioux tribes of South Dakota, North Dakota, and Nebraska
for generations and that the project’s legitimacy and ultimate success depend on its ability to continue fostering
the tribes’ endorsement of and participation in the Court’s
development and implementation.
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courts. These issues include the persistence of historic principles of
federal Indian law supporting tribes’ inherent sovereignty, the impact
of modern Supreme Court decisions on the scope of tribes’ criminal
and civil jurisdiction in Indian country, the importance of the tribal
court exhaustion doctrine in leveraging respect for the work of tribal
courts, and a number of specific and complex cutting-edge issues that
tribes are currently confronting and will continue to grapple with in
the future.
The report strongly recommends immediately instituting a Great
Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center as a prerequisite for establishing
the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court. The Center would consist of
a number of crucial components, including an Indian law library, an
Indian law research component, a tribal law and culture journal, a legislative drafting project, a constitution revision project, and an economic development project. The report emphasizes that a strong and
permanent Great Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center would function
as the indispensable infrastructure for manifesting the vision of a Great
Sioux Nation Supreme Court.
Finally, the report addresses a number of crucial issues concerning the ultimate establishment of the Court itself. These issues include
the Court’s composition in terms of participating tribes, the Court’s relationship with existing tribal appellate courts, the qualifications and
selection of justices, the Court’s enabling legislation and judicial rules,
the Court’s jurisdiction, the governing law to be applied by the Court,
and enforcement of the Court’s judgments.
The Wakpa Sica Historical Society’s Reconciliation Place Project
has the potential of making an enormous and lasting contribution to
the strengthening of tribal sovereignty. The project’s regional and cultural focus comprises a truly innovative approach to supporting the
heroic efforts of Indian tribes to endure and prosper as strong, selfgoverning indigenous nations. The authors of this report are honored
to have participated in envisioning and elaborating the concrete steps
that must be taken to make the present dream of a Great Sioux Nation
Supreme Court a future reality for the constituent Lakota, Dakota, and
Nakota nations.
INTRODUCTION

The Wakpa Sica Historical Society’s Reconciliation Place Project is a
wide-ranging undertaking that envisions establishing a physical structure in Fort Pierre, South Dakota, a historical trading site for members
of the Great Sioux Nation and various non-Indian traders and commercial interests, and a significant site in the journeys of Lewis and Clark.
The project regards the location as neutral but historically significant.
Various intended components of this effort include establishment of a
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reconciliation place, a repatriation center, a museum, and assistance in
establishing a Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court.
The Historical Society has received an exploratory “planning”
grant from the United States Justice Department to develop more thorough analysis and recommendations concerning the merits, details,
and viability of the various efforts listed above. This report focuses on
issues and recommendations concerning the Great Sioux Nation
Supreme Court component.
The concept of a Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court certainly
does not originate with the Wakpa Sica Historical Society. Rather, it is
an idea or vision that has existed within the Great Sioux Nation for
generations that the Society fully recognizes and supports. It is rare,
for example, to engage in conversation with tribal people about tribal
courts and justice in which the concept of a Great Sioux Nation
Supreme Court does not soon come into play. Yet until recently there
has been very little in-depth discussion of the theoretical and practical
issues surrounding the establishment of a Great Sioux Nation Supreme
Court.1
This report is designed to provide a historical and contemporary
context for the project, which includes a needs assessment of tribal
courts within South Dakota, North Dakota, and Nebraska, a summary
of legal issues facing tribal courts, discussion of the establishment of
a Great Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center as the necessary infrastructure supporting the capstone work of establishing the Great Sioux
Nation Supreme Court, and discussion of the issues surrounding the
establishment of the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court itself.
The report is designed to provide a basis for continuing discussion and implementation of the project, including elements to assist the project in achieving legitimacy, maintaining longevity, and
enhancing impact within the Great Sioux Nation. Many projects—
judicial and otherwise—have come and gone within Sioux country because they lacked legitimacy and vision. As noted above, vision for
such a project already exists within the Great Sioux Nation. Legitimacy
can flow only from full tribal understanding, endorsement, and active
participation in the development and implementation of the Great
Sioux Nation Supreme Court. Formation of the Court involves an act
of (collective) tribal sovereignty and therefore cannot be imposed regardless of the Historical Society’s good will or depth of funding.
The Wakpa Sica Historical Society’s Reconciliation Project has
great potential, but only if it can “walk the talk” of its proposal with
integrity, patience, and insight and if it fully understands its role as
partner and facilitator and not owner or controller of the project itself.
To date, the Wakpa Sica Historical Society has clearly demonstrated
its willingness and ability to embrace these kinds of operating principles. In order to advance this potential, the report will provide both a
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description of the relevant issues as well as recommendations concerning how to deal with these specific principles, remembering all the
while that the tribes of the Great Sioux Nation are the heart and soul of
what is possible in this significant undertaking.
NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF TRIBAL COURTS
I N S O U T H D A K O TA , N O RT H D A K O TA ,
AND NEBRASKA
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While it goes without saying that tribal courts both nationwide and
within the project region have significant unmet needs, it is important
not to forget their rapid growth in competence and maturity within the
last twenty-five years. This is a fact that has been recognized by many
scholars and practitioners within the field.2 In fact it is often this very
reality of rapid growth that has created new needs that both local and
national units of government have not been able to keep up with or
even, in some cases, to adequately understand.
The needs identified herein flow from the expertise and experience of the authors of the report and accompanying survey3 and of
members of the relevant tribal judiciaries as shared with the authors in
ongoing discussions. These needs are not prioritized but are particularized to the tribal courts within the region. Needs assessments can often
be bloated and generic because they often have no contextual or experiential grounding. That is not the case in this instance.
As this section on needs assessment makes clear, at least implicitly, there is a necessity to address some of the issues concerning current
tribal courts in order to ensure that there is a firm infrastructure on
which to graft a Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court. To ignore the infrastructure question is to invite failure and disappointment. The recommendations to address these “needs” are found in a later section of
this report.4
Improved Access to Legal Research
A primary element in the making of quality legal decisions at both the
trial and appellate levels is the capacity to perform the necessary legal
research with which to resolve the issues raised by the case. Judges in
both the state and federal context rely extensively on the work of their
clerks. This need has not been ameliorated by the advent of computerized research, which might “speed up” research but does nothing to
parse the cases and to synthesize what the cases mean and how they
fit together. As a result, tribal courts are often doubly disadvantaged.
They have no consistent computerized access to the ever-expanding
raw material of decision making (cases, statutes, legislative history, administrative rules, etc.) and generally no access to the synthesizing

The raw legal data of many tribal court judicial decisions are the cases
and precedents of other tribal courts, particularly other tribal courts in
the region. Given the relative youth of many tribal courts a considerable number of their decisions involve cases of first impression. The decisions of other tribal courts in similar matters therefore become a crucial ingredient and adjunct in the making of many tribal court decisions.
Currently, much of this jurisprudential base is not available to
tribal courts. The only national reporter of tribal court decisions is the
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hand of a law clerk to digest, organize, summarize, and integrate the
relevant research.
As a result of these shortcomings, and consonant with the most
conventional of wisdoms, tribal courts need consistent access to legal
research as is available through the LEXIS and Westlaw electronic
databases. Yet even here there are unique Indian law problems because
the critical resource of tribal court opinions is not yet consistently
available on-line. This wave of the present (not future) threatens to bypass or barely touch many tribal courts. Tribal courts therefore require
the hardware, software, and training to go with computerized research.
It is also true, however, that many other tribal law resources such as
treaties, constitutions, and codes are not available on-line, and thus
print libraries also must be maintained.
This is, however, a necessary but not sufficient condition for tribal judges to develop research parity with their state and federal colleagues. The danger here is to assume that a technological fix is all that
is needed, that research is technology. It is not. Technology generates
the raw material of meaningful research, but it takes a law clerk, a person with some sense of craft, to refine these raw materials into a more
usable and malleable form for judges to actually use.
In a related vein, technology and computer programming are
necessary ingredients to develop consistently coherent case files and
case management systems. An essential element of the administration
of justice is just that: the ability to manage individual cases and the
docket as a whole in an expeditious and efficient manner (“Justice delayed is justice denied,” etc.). Yet there also needs to be a similar recognition that cases are ultimately not administered by computers but
by individuals who require the necessary training, recompense, and
recognition to provide equity and to avoid the problems that often result in chronic turnover at the critical case management and administrative level. Court clerks and administrative personnel are vital cogs in
the wheels of justice, and meeting their needs is key to enhancing the
functioning of this often overlooked and underappreciated sector of
tribal courts.
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Indian Law Reporter, a publication of the American Indian Resources
Institute/American Indian Lawyer Training Program in Oakland, California. This reporter is in the nature of a monthly looseleaf service that
is not available on-line and is quite expensive. Few, if any, tribal courts
in the project region maintain a current subscription.
One response to this shortcoming would be the development of
a Great Sioux Nation Law Reporter to reprint all the decisions—both
trial and appellate—of the courts of constituent tribal participants in
the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court. Such a reporter could be issued in print on a quarterly basis and made available on-line weekly.
The on-line publication could be one of several offerings to be found at
a Great Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center Web page fully describing the scope of the project and related services.5
The establishment of an effective reporter—both print and electronic—would have the collateral benefits of making such decisions
available to others nationally and outside the region as well as advancing the legitimacy of the overall program because of its delivery of important services in a timely and regular manner just like similar activities in the state and federal judicial systems. Since there is often a
paucity of available precedent, such publication efforts will fill a significant void. And in order to do this effectively, print and technology
must be in a complementary relationship. The work-product of any
court is its decisions, and such an important work-product needs to
circulate quickly and effectively. Without such a dedicated effort, the
courts might appear inefficient and prone to excessive delay. Such a reporter would also be an invaluable resource to attorneys preparing to
appear before these courts.
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Availability of “Law Clerks” to Perform Legal Research
As discussed above, improved legal research is not the product of a
simple technological fix but requires a law-trained individual not only
to assist in the doing of the research but also to organize, describe, and
synthesize the research for the applicable judge or panel of judges.
Legal research in this context also includes the capacity of such an
individual to assist and participate in the other potential projects described below 6 relative to legislative drafting, constitutional review,
and economic development. In the absence of such an individual or
individuals, this exciting project is likely to be static rather than dynamic, constrictive rather than expansive, and pedestrian rather than
innovative.
Legal research is more than the generation of information. It requires interaction with a trained human and legal intelligence to put
that information in a useful and usable context. Regardless of potential
cost, the need for law clerks is essential. Much of this legal research

could be performed by University of South Dakota and University of
North Dakota law students on a supervised and compensated basis as a
valuable legal and intern experience. Such internships would provide
unique opportunities for law students to contribute to and learn about
tribal courts and the field of Indian law.
This need is underscored by the extensive caseloads that face
most tribal courts.7 These exceptionally high caseloads put a very high
premium on the time of tribal judges. The pressure to hear and decide
cases in order to advance and manage the judicial docket efficiently
is immense, and not surprisingly it greatly reduces the time available
to judges to do legal research. In these circumstances, access to a law
clerk to do research is a twofold gift. It is likely to enhance the quality
of justice rendered in a particular case and to improve the quality of
justice across the entire system because of greater efficiency in the administration of justice.
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Training is an absolute necessity in order to continue to advance the
development of tribal courts. Training is required in all sectors: judges,
clerks/administrators, prosecutors/public defenders, and members of
the private and tribal bar. This need for training can be divided roughly into two components: one is a component related to the uniqueness
of tribal courts and Indian law, a specialized kind of continuing legal
education (CLE) approach; and the other is the related issue relative to
working for and in a developing tribal institution seeking to advance
competence and efficiency but with a sense of cultural continuity.
Tribal judges. Indian law is increasingly a field of rapid and complex development.8 These changes often have profound implications
for tribal court jurisdiction as well as the attendant governing law. In
addition there is often an increased demand for the development and
application of tribal common law. Given the rapidity and significance
of these legal developments, training for tribal judges to help keep
them abreast in CLE fashion in these areas of law is critical to ensuring
the continuation of legally reliable decision making.
It is also true that tribal trial judges continue to need training in
the context of improving their skills in handling trials with or without
juries. This is important for several reasons, including expanding caseloads, expanding complexity of cases tried in tribal trial courts, and
delivering procedural (as opposed to substantive) equity. This kind of
training is particularly relevant for the non-law-trained members of the
tribal judiciary.
There is also the need for training to assist tribal judges—at both
the trial and appellate level—to improve and enhance their ability to
write thoughtful and cogent legal opinions to explain and justify their
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decisions. Such efforts, for example, might reduce the likelihood of appeal in that a fair number of current tribal court appeals are filed simply
because there is no adequate explanation of the trial court’s decision.
This training also knits together with the availability of law clerks to
establish a research base from which tribal judges can craft well-written
decisions.
Another cultural—though seldom articulated—benefit of training is the opportunity of the judges themselves to share insight and
frustration and to develop a sense of community as people serving the
individual tribes of the Great Sioux Nation. A sense of community and
collegiality are essential elements in forging an enduring and committed tribal judiciary.
Clerks and court administrators. Training of clerks and court
administrators is no less essential to the well-being and advancement
of tribal courts. With increasing caseloads and stature as well, the demand on clerks to maintain accurate and concise file records (both
manually and electronically) will become increasingly pressing. And
while training at this level has been overlooked and underappreciated,
any judge or practitioner knows it is the clerks who are the glue that
holds the system together.
Court administrators are also under the gun as a result of expanding caseloads and outside scrutiny to ensure and improve the flow of
tribal dockets in order to maintain and enhance the administration of
justice within Indian country. This training needs to be able to respond
to both the systems that remain essentially manual in nature and those
that are electronically managed in whole or in part. Individuals in these
situations need training in the context of not only what their current
case management systems are but also what they are likely to be in the
future, especially in the likely transfer and transition from manual to
electronic and computer-based models.
Tribal prosecutors and public defenders. Again, the obvious:
any person serving as prosecutor or public defender has a tremendous
responsibility in the pursuit of justice within the tribal criminal justice
system. As the numbers indicate, the overwhelming bulk of most tribal
court dockets is taken up with criminal matters, and therefore training
of prosecutors and public defenders must be a central component. This
is especially true when a moderate to significant number of tribal prosecutors are still not formally law-trained. It is also to be noted that for
those tribes that do not have public defender systems such training (on
the defense side) should be made available to any individual—whether
law-trained or not—who does criminal defense work within the tribal
court system.
Given the raw fact that personal liberty is at stake in criminal
proceedings and that the right to counsel guarantee in the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 is not mandatory on the tribes,9 the utmost in train-

ing needs in this area should be made a priority and preference. Prosecution and defense work is labor intensive, and therefore training, both
procedural and substantive, as well as case management assistance are
central to maintaining due process and respect for individual liberty.
Private counsel who practice in tribal court. As noted in many
areas throughout this report, the practice of Indian law, especially in
tribal courts, is both unique and subject to rapid change. This fact
points to the necessity of training based on the CLE model in state and
federal settings for practitioners who practice regularly in tribal court.
All courts—but particularly tribal courts—are substantially affected by
the quality and expertise of the practicing bar. Therefore it is incumbent upon tribes to provide CLE opportunities for their practitioners.
The delivery of these programs is best administered through
tribal bar associations where they exist,10 but in their absence (which is
the norm), they must be provided by the tribal courts themselves. This
training needs to focus—as it does in the state and federal context—on
new developments in the law, especially Indian law in its broadest
meaning and the local law of the particular tribe. Changes in Indian
law are often wide-sweeping and need to be understood and responded
to with dispatch.
All of these training needs require money, and because many
tribes, especially in the project area, are not economically flush, the
provision of outside funding to meet these needs is pivotal. In complementary fashion, it is worth noting that salary levels are generally low
in all tribal court sectors, particularly at the clerk and administrator
level, and there needs to be attention focused on salary (and benefits)
concerns as critical dimensions relative to improving staffing stability
and continuity. Such funding and budgetary matters may be addressed
in a detailed fashion in a subsequent report upon direction of the Historical Society and the participating tribes.
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Since 1970, when President Nixon announced a groundbreaking federal executive policy supporting tribal self-determination,11 Indian tribes
throughout the United States have exercised their inherent sovereign
powers of self-government with increasing determination, consistency
and innovation. This modern surge in tribal efforts at “doing sovereignty”12 has resulted in a dramatic proliferation and refinement of tribal judicial systems, and has spurred congressional action lending additional support for the maintenance and development of tribal courts.13
Today, Indian tribes and the federal government alike recognize that
strengthening tribal judicial systems is crucial for ensuring the survival
of Indian tribes as sovereign nations and for facilitating the general
health, well-being, and prosperity of tribal communities.
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Running parallel to this encouraging tribal-federal collaboration
in the development of strong and sophisticated tribal judicial systems
are unprecedented, countervailing changes in the doctrines of federal
Indian law emerging from recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. These decisions have been criticized as “signaling a dramatic retreat from the Court’s historic role as protector of the rights of Indian
tribes under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States,
and as a function of inherent tribal sovereignty.”14 Because of these decisions, Indian tribes, in seizing the opportunities for broad exercise of
their inherent sovereign powers, must also be wary of the limitations
on the exercise of tribal powers imposed by the Supreme Court. What
follows is a summary of the increasingly complex contours of federal
Indian law impacting the exercise of tribal courts’ adjudicatory powers.
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Historic Principles of Indian Law Affecting Tribal Court
Jurisdiction in Indian Country
Like tribal governmental powers generally, tribal court adjudicatory
authority derives ultimately from the inherent sovereignty of Indian
tribes as self-governing indigenous nations whose origins predate the
establishment of the United States government and the colonization
of the American continents by European forces.15 In three landmark
cases of the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court under the
leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall established a number of core
principles governing the field of federal Indian law.
In Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823), the Court held that Indian tribes’ inherent sovereign powers, as constrained under United States law, do not
include the power to alienate tribal lands without the consent of the
United States.16 The Court reasoned that as a consequence of the “discovery” of Indian lands by European powers, the United States as successor to those “discovering” nations holds “ultimate title” to Indian
lands, with Indian tribes retaining a “right of occupancy.”17 In Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia (1831), the Court held that Indian tribes are not “foreign
states” for purposes of the Constitution’s conferral of Supreme Court
original jurisdiction over suits between states and “foreign states.”18 The
Court suggested that instead of meriting the label “foreign states,” Indian
tribes “may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. . . . Their relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian.”19 And in Worcester v. Georgia (1832), the Court firmly rebuffed an effort by the State of Georgia to annihilate the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation by forcing the application of Georgia’s laws
within federally protected Cherokee country.20 The Court declared:
The Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described,
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Altogether, these foundational cases establish the following core
propositions of federal Indian law: (1) Indian tribes, though not “foreign states,” are sovereign nations;22 (2) Indian tribes may not exercise
specific sovereign powers that compromise the territorial security of
the United States;23 (3) the United States has a general obligation to
protect, defend, and support Indian tribes, as the tribes’ “guardian”;24
and (4) tribal sovereignty is absolutely protected under the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States from invasion and dispossession
by the states.25
In the late nineteenth century a new, additional principle began
emerging from the Supreme Court’s Indian law decisions that, like the
principles from the Marshall Trilogy, has profoundly affected the exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty: the principle of congressional “plenary power” in Indian affairs. In United States v. Kagama (1886), the Court
affirmed the power of Congress to vest jurisdiction over serious felonies
committed on Indian reservations in the federal courts, thereby depriving Indian tribes of a substantial portion of their inherent sovereign
authority to prosecute offenders.26 Although the Court intimated that
broad congressional authority over Indians “is necessary to their protection,”27 it is clear that the Kagama Court viewed congressional power
in Indian affairs as broader than what fairly can be inferred from the
Marshall Court’s principles of federal recognition of tribes as sovereign
nations, national territorial security-based limitations on inherent tribal
sovereignty, the federal-tribal trust relationship, and protection of tribes
from assertions of dominion by the states. Indeed, so expansive was the
Kagama Court’s vision of congressional power in Indian affairs that the
Court refused to confine that power to any particular provision of
the Constitution,28 and distorted the Marshall Trilogy to deny any constraint on congressional power discernible in those foundational cases.29
Although steeped in error and incompatible with the Marshall
principles, Kagama’s novel assertion of sweeping congressional power
over Indians soon became an entrenched part of the Supreme Court’s
Indian law jurisprudence. Indeed, in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903),30 the
Court stretched this newly invented “doctrine” to the point of practically subverting the Marshall Trilogy’s core concern about federal protection of Indian rights. In Lone Wolf, the Court refused to review the legality of Congress’s decision to abrogate the Medicine Lodge Treaty
with the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Tribes by forcibly opening
the tribes’ reservation to white settlers despite the treaty’s express requirement of tribal consent.31 The Court stated:
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in which the laws of Georgia can have no force. . . . The
whole intercourse between the United States and this
nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.21
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When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the
United States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted
that the power to abrogate existed in Congress. . . .
. . . If injury was occasioned . . . by the use made by
Congress of its power, relief must be sought by an appeal
to that body for redress and not to the courts.32
Lone Wolf ’s suggestion that the exercise of congressional power
in Indian affairs is exempt from judicial review has been modified by
subsequent doctrinal developments.33 However, the central theme of
expansive congressional power in Indian affairs pervading both Kagama
and Lone Wolf has emerged as a fundamental principle of the field of
federal Indian law.
In synthesizing the disparate historic principles defining the
field, Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law observes:
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Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of decisions, is that those powers which are
lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but
rather “inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has
never been extinguished.”34
The core proposition that Indian tribes possess all inherent sovereign powers that have not been “extinguished” is the essential starting point for understanding the convoluted contours of tribal adjudicatory authority declared by the modern Supreme Court. As amplified
below, many of the modern Supreme Court’s restrictions on tribes’ inherent power to adjudicate are at odds with the fundamental Indian
law principles articulated in the Marshall Trilogy and supplemented by
the congressional plenary power doctrine. Indeed, a number of prominent Indian law scholars have suggested that these decisions are a disturbing result of the modern Court’s failure to appreciate the meaning
and significance of the Court’s own historic Indian law principles and
to apply these principles in addressing disputes involving the exercise
of Indian rights.35 To the extent that these decisions are thus the result
of error, they may comprise only a temporary repression of inherent
tribal adjudicatory power under United States law.
Scope of Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction
in Indian Country
In light of core principles of Indian law, a sovereign Indian tribe theoretically has inherent power to prosecute criminal offenders within the
tribe’s territory unless (1) such power has been limited or “extinguished”
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in the exercise of Congress’s “plenary power” in Indian affairs, or
(2) the exercise of such power compromises or threatens the territorial
security of the United States. As mentioned previously, Congress effectively diminished tribes’ inherent power to adjudicate a number of
serious felonies committed in Indian country when Congress enacted
the 1885 Major Crimes Act, a statute upheld by the Supreme Court in
Kagama v. United States.36
In 1978, the modern Supreme Court began departing dramatically from fundamental principles when the Court addressed the scope
of a tribe’s inherent power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, the Court held that “Indian tribes
do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians.”37
Writing for the majority, then-Justice Rehnquist refused to ground the
Court’s denial of tribal criminal adjudicatory power over non-Indians
in either the congressional plenary power doctrine or the Marshall
Trilogy’s national territorial security limitation on inherent tribal sovereignty. Instead, Rehnquist announced a broad new theory of “judicially made Indian law”38 for limiting inherent tribal authority: the socalled implicit divestiture theory.39 Under this new theory, “Indian
tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous
states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers ‘inconsistent with their status.’ ”40
Thus, the Oliphant Court transmogrified the Marshall Court’s national territorial security-based limitation on inherent tribal sovereignty into an expansive theory for stripping tribes of inherent sovereign
power based on the Court’s own impressions and projections concerning the tribes’ inferior “status.” Dubiously purporting to discern evidence that historically “Congress shared the view of the Executive
Branch and the lower federal courts that Indian tribal courts were without jurisdiction to try non-Indians,” the Oliphant Court concluded that
because of their inferior “status,” Indian tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.41
In 1990, the Supreme Court invoked Oliphant’s “implicit divestiture” theory to deprive Indian tribes of inherent power to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over “nonmember Indians,” i.e., Indians who are
members of tribes other than the forum tribe. In Duro v. Reina, the Court
held that “Indian tribes lack [criminal] jurisdiction over persons who
are not tribe members.”42 Conceding that evidence of a past federal assumption that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians was “somewhat less illuminating than in Oliphant,”43 the Court
nevertheless asserted its belief that the exercise of such jurisdiction was
irreconcilable with the “the tribes’ status as limited sovereigns.”44 As
in Oliphant, the Court in Duro thus defied the Marshall Trilogy’s overriding concern about ensuring plenary protection of Indian rights under
federal law and instead used the occasion of the Duro dispute to give
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expression to the Court’s own conviction—evoking the racially derogatory assumptions underlying the discredited “discovery” doctrine45 that
Indian tribes are inherently inferior.
Responding to the Supreme Court’s erroneous analysis and holding in Duro, Congress overrode that decision in 1991 by expressly recognizing and affirming Indian tribes’ inherent authority to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians in Indian country, regardless of
the particular tribal membership of Indian defendants.46 In the course
of this legislation’s enactment, the Committee of Conference explained
that it was “clarifying an inherent right which tribal governments have
always held and was never questioned until . . . Duro. . . . The Congressional power to correct the Court’s misinterpretation is manifest
as is its plenary power over Indian tribes, which derives from the
Constitution.”47
In view of the Major Crimes Act, Oliphant, Duro, and the Durocorrecting legislation, Indian tribes today retain their inherent sovereign power to exercise misdemeanor criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians in Indian country.48 The most prominent issue facing tribal
courts with respect to this retained criminal jurisdictional authority is
how best to exercise it without exciting additional efforts by the current activist Supreme Court to strip tribes of this crucial attribute of inherent sovereignty.
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Scope of Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country
Theoretically, the scope of an Indian tribe’s inherent civil adjudicatory
power under federal law is determined according to the same historic
parameters defining the scope of tribes’ inherent criminal adjudicatory
power: the Marshall Trilogy principles supplemented by the congressional plenary power doctrine. Despite the Supreme Court’s embrace
of a doubtful theory comparable to “implicit divestiture” in post-Oliphant
cases addressing the scope of tribes’ inherent civil legislative authority in
Indian country,49 several cases decided before and after Oliphant indicated the Court’s recognition that tribes’ inherent civil adjudicatory
authority in Indian country is broad, in keeping with the Marshall principles and subject only to narrowly construed limitations expressly imposed by Congress.
In Williams v. Lee (1959), for example, the Supreme Court invalidated an attempt by an Arizona court to adjudicate a civil action
brought by a non-Indian plaintiff against Navajo citizens for an alleged
breach of contract occurring within the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation.50 Although the Court posited that Worcester ’s “broad principles” protecting Indian tribes from state incursions in Indian country
had been “modified . . . in cases where essential tribal relations were not
involved and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized,” it
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Creation of a federal cause of action for the enforcement
of rights created in Title I [of ICRA] . . . plainly would be at
odds with the congressional goal of protecting tribal selfgovernment. Not only would it undermine the authority
of tribal forums, but it would also impose serious financial
burdens on already “financially disadvantaged” tribes.
. . . Tribal forums are available to vindicate rights
created by the ICRA. . . . Tribal courts have repeatedly
been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive
adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and
property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.58
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concluded that “to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and
hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”51
In another pre-Oliphant case, Fisher v. District Court (1976),52 the
Court again endorsed the inherent power of Indian tribes to exercise
civil jurisdiction in Indian country. Fisher addressed the question of
whether a Montana court had “jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding in which all parties are members of the [Northern Cheyenne] Tribe
and residents of the . . . Reservation.”53 The Supreme Court held that
the state court had no such jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the
exercise of jurisdiction by the state court would infringe “[t]he right of
the . . . Tribe to govern itself independently of state law” in violation of
the tribal sovereignty-affirming rule of Williams v. Lee and in contravention of federal statutes protecting the Tribe’s right of self-government.54
The Court held that “[s]ince the adoption proceeding is appropriately
characterized as litigation arising on the Indian reservation, the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court is exclusive.”55 Williams and Fisher both indicate that prior to Oliphant, the Supreme Court manifested its obligation
to protect the sovereignty of Indian tribes by recognizing and affirming tribes’ broad inherent powers to exercise civil adjudicatory authority in Indian country.
This trend of Supreme Court recognition of tribes’ broad inherent civil adjudicatory powers continued after Oliphant as well. For instance, two months after Oliphant stripped tribes of inherent criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court rendered another decision
supportive of tribes’ inherent civil adjudicatory power and harmonious
with foundational principles of Indian law. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
(1978), the Court narrowly construed the 1968 Indian Civil Rights
Act’s grant of federal court remedial authority, thus minimizing ICRA’s
intrusion into the sovereign domain of tribal courts.56 In concluding
that ICRA does not give rise to implied injunctive or declaratory civil
remedies other than habeas corpus enforceable against Indian tribes or
tribal officials in federal court,57 the Court stated:
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The Court offered similar endorsements of tribes’ civil adjudicatory authority in the post-Oliphant decisions of National Farmers Union
Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe (1985)59 and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante
(1987).60 In National Farmers, the Court unanimously held that with respect to a civil claim brought in tribal court, challengers to the tribe’s
jurisdiction must exhaust their remedies in tribal court before being
permitted to assert a federal common law question in federal court
about the limits of the tribe’s jurisdiction.61 The Court squarely rejected the argument that Indian tribes lack inherent civil power over nonIndians by force of Oliphant’s fiat depriving tribes of inherent criminal
power over non-Indians:
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[T]he question whether a tribal court has the power to
exercise civil subject-matter jurisdiction over non-Indians
in a case of this kind is not automatically foreclosed, as an
extension of Oliphant would require. Rather, the existence
and extent of a tribal court’s jurisdiction will require a
careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to
which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or
diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes,
Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions.
We believe that examination should be conducted
in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself.62
The Supreme Court again demonstrated respect for the exercise
of tribes’ inherent civil adjudicatory powers in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co.
v. LaPlante.63 In Iowa Mutual, the Court clarified that the tribal court exhaustion requirement announced in National Farmers applies even where
the challenger to the tribal court’s jurisdiction seeks federal judicial review based on a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction rather than federalquestion jurisdiction.64 The Court supported this holding with a strong
affirmation of tribes’ broad inherent civil adjudicatory powers in Indian
country: “Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction
over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute.”65
Significantly, the Iowa Mutual Court did not list “implicit divestiture” as
one of the means by which tribes’ inherent civil adjudicatory powers
could be “affirmatively limited,” suggesting that the Court regarded such
powers as unaffected by the Oliphant line of cases.
These multiple signals in cases decided before and after Oliphant
suggested that despite the modern Court’s imposition of unprecedented limitations on the scope of tribes’ inherent criminal and legislative
powers, tribes’ civil adjudicatory powers remained broad, consistent with
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fundamental principles of Indian law. However, in 1997, the Court imparted a decidedly contrary signal. In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court
unanimously held that the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation had no inherent power to adjudicate a civil dispute
between non-Indians stemming from an automobile accident occurring on a highway maintained by the State of North Dakota and passing across the reservation pursuant to a federally granted right-ofway.66 The Court stated that “tribal courts may not entertain claims
against nonmembers arising out of accidents on state highways, absent
a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers on the highway in question.”67
In reaching this result, the Court rejected the argument of the
tribes and the United States as amicus curiae that the principle of
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual deferential to tribal court jurisdiction,
and not the countervailing Oliphant line of cases, controls an inquiry
into the scope of tribes’ inherent civil adjudicatory authority.68 Instead,
the Court insisted, even with respect to the question of the scope of inherent civil adjudicatory powers, tribes are subject to Oliphant’s “status”based “implicit divestiture” rule as extended to cases addressing tribes’
inherent civil legislative powers in “the pathmarking case”69 of Montana v.
United States.70 After thus expanding Montana’s main rule—that “the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe”71 to cover tribal adjudicatory power in
addition to tribal legislative power, the Court went on to further extend
Montana to jurisdictional questions involving conduct on federally granted rights-of-way in addition to conduct on non-Indian-owned fee lands
within reservation boundaries.72
Finally, in ultimately depriving the Three Affiliated Tribes of their
inherent judicial authority, the Strate Court drastically narrowed the
scope of Montana’s crucial exceptions, which permitted tribal civil jurisdiction within reservation boundaries over (1) “activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members”
and (2) conduct of nonmembers that “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe.”73 Conceding the fact that the defendant in the
tribal court suit, A-1 Contractors, indeed had “enter[ed] [a] consensual
relationship[ ] with the tribe or its members,” the Strate Court nevertheless refused to acknowledge the applicability of Montana’s first exception, opining that “[t]he dispute . . . is ‘distinctly non-tribal in nature.’”74
In similar fashion, the Strate Court refused to recognize the applicability of Montana’s second exception. Conceding, again, that “[u]ndoubtedly, those who drive carelessly on a public highway running through
a reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize the
safety of tribal members,”75 the Court nevertheless narrowed Montana’s
second exception to cases in which the exercise of tribal jurisdiction is
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“necessary to protect tribal self-government.”76 Asserting without analysis that “[n]either regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over the state
highway accident is necessary to preserve ‘the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them,’ ” the Court concluded that “[t]he Montana rule, therefore, and not its exceptions, applies to this case.”77
With its overreaching dictate of “judicially made Indian law”78 in
Strate curtailing the scope of tribes’ inherent civil adjudicatory authority, the Supreme Court defied the foundational principles of Indian law
and the Court’s own numerous precedents broadly supporting the
jurisdiction of tribal courts.79 Moreover, to the extent the Strate Court
attempted to make its dubious “status”-based common law mandate repressing tribal sovereignty apply to the exercise of tribes’ civil adjudicatory authority over nonmember Indians as well as non-Indians—a purported exercise of federal judicial power of doubtful constitutional
validity in any event80—the Court further defied the tribal sovereigntyaffirming position of Congress vis-à-vis nonmember Indians as reflected in the Duro-correcting legislation of 1991 recognizing the inherent
criminal jurisdiction of Indian tribes over nonmember Indians81 and
overriding the Supreme Court’s erroneous contrary impressions in Duro
v. Reina.82 Strate thus stands out as an example of the Rehnquist Court’s
tendency to displace Congress’s historic policymaking role in Indian
affairs with a constitutionally suspect brand of judicial “legislation” of
the Court’s own creation.
Because of Strate’s embrace of Oliphant’s marauding “implicit divestiture” theory, Indian tribes in exercising their adjudicatory powers
must be wary of the possibility that the Rehnquist Court will continue
eroding those powers in future cases. Strate appears to have reversed
the presumption in favor of tribal court civil jurisdiction over nonIndians in Indian country as stated in Iowa Mutual and discernible in
other pre-Strate cases.83 After Strate, a tribe presumably has no civil legislative or adjudicatory jurisdiction over the conduct of non-Indians
on non-Indian-owned fee lands or state highways within reservation
boundaries. The tribe may rebut this presumption only by successfully
invoking either of the Montana exceptions as narrowed by Strate, or by
locating an affirmative congressional delegation of governmental authority by treaty or statute.84 The tribe retains its inherent civil legislative and adjudicatory authority over the conduct of tribal members,
however, and arguably of nonmember Indians as well.85
Loss of Tribal Court Jurisdiction as a Result
of the “Shrinking” of Indian Country
In addition to repressing Indian tribes’ criminal and civil jurisdiction by
expanding the antitribal “implicit divestiture” theory first deployed in

1978 in Oliphant, the Supreme Court has further impounded tribes’ inherent sovereign powers by interpreting congressional statutes bearing
on the territorial extent of “Indian country” in a manner adverse to the
protection of tribes’ rights and thus inconsistent with foundational
principles of Indian law. “Indian country” has a precise definition in the
United States Code:

S A
W I C A Z O
SPRING 2002

As explained in Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, federal recognition of an area as “Indian country” is critical because “[t]ribes
exercise substantial governing powers in their territory, they have important economic and property rights, and a number of federal laws
also govern other relationships, all to the exclusion of state law.”87
By interpreting “Indian country” narrowly in contravention of longstanding canons of construction deferential to the congressional policy of
protecting Indian rights, the modern Supreme Court effectively has implemented an antithetical judicial policy of eroding Indian rights for the
benefit of the states.
A prominent illustration of the Supreme Court’s policy of “shrinking” Indian country under the guise of statutory interpretation is the
Court’s activism in expanding and deploying the judicial doctrine of
the diminishment/disestablishment of Indian reservations. Beginning
in 1975 with DeCoteau v. District County Court,88 the Court has dramatically reduced the sovereign jurisdiction of a number of tribes—most of
them in South Dakota—by concluding that “surplus land” statutes
of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century conveyed
a clear congressional intent to diminish or “disestablish” the tribes’ respective reservations.
In DeCoteau, the Court held that an 1891 Act of Congress stating
that “[t]he Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Dakota or Sioux Indians
hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and covey” to the United States all the
unallotted lands within the boundaries of the Lake Traverse Indian
Reservation for “the sum of [$2.50] per acre” thereby expressed Congress’s clear intent also to eliminate the reservation altogether.89 The Court
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[T]he term “Indian country” . . . means (a) all land within
the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state,
and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which
have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.86
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effected this wholesale destruction of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux
Tribe’s territorial sovereignty despite the fact that in the 1891 Act “[t]here
is not a word to suggest that the boundaries of the reservation were altered.”90 The Court refused to apply “the rule by which legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of Indians,” asserting that “[a] canon of
construction is not a license to disregard clear expressions of tribal and
congressional intent.”91
As Justice Douglas explained in dissent, “[t]he dimensions of the
tragedy inflicted by [the DeCoteau] decision” were enormous.92 The decision immediately produced a “ ‘crazy quilt’ or ‘checkerboard’ jurisdiction [that] defeats the right of tribal self-government guaranteed by
[treaty]” by confining the territorial reach of the tribe’s sovereign powers to Indian-owned allotments interspersed throughout the former
boundaries of the “disestablished” reservation.93 Equally disturbing was
the Court’s creation of an unprincipled precedent for expediting the
destruction of tribal sovereignty by interpreting turn-of-the-century
“surplus land” statutes silent with respect to reservation boundaries as
bespeaking Congress’s intent to eliminate or diminish those boundaries. Hence, since 1975, the Court has employed and expanded its
corrosive diminishment/disestablishment doctrine to drastically reduce
the size of the Rosebud Reservation in South Dakota, the Uintah Valley
Reservation in Utah, and, most recently, the Yankton Sioux Reservation
in South Dakota.94
This pattern of decisions indicates the enormity of the threat to
Indian tribes stemming from the modern Supreme Court’s unprincipled
approach to the issue of tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction in Indian
country. The diminishment /disestablishment decisions demonstrate
that the Court’s defiance of inherent tribal sovereignty is not confined
to erroneous common law opinions like Oliphant, Duro, Montana, and
Strate but infuses cases of statutory interpretation as well. As mentioned
previously, the Court accomplishes this restriction of inherent tribal
sovereignty in cases of statutory interpretation by refusing to apply
the long-standing Indian law canons of construction, which reflect the
presumptive good faith of Congress in dealing with Indian tribes and
Indian people—a good faith required by fundamental principles of
Indian law.95 Thus, Justice Blackmun observed in his dissenting opinion
in Hagen v. Utah (1994), “Although the [Court] purports to apply these
[Indian law] canons in principle, it ignores them in practice, resolving
every ambiguity in the statutory language, legislative history, and surrounding circumstances in favor of the State.”96
Because the Rehnquist Court shows no signs of desiring to bring
its cases construing “Indian country” in line with fundamental principles of Indian law, tribes must be cognizant of the momentous issue
of territorial sovereignty at stake in every exercise of tribal jurisdiction
entailing a determination of reservation boundaries.97 This caveat would

seem especially pressing with respect to a tribal court’s exercise of jurisdiction over any dispute arising from a transaction or occurrence taking place on land that a party alleges to be no longer part of “Indian
country.”
Tribal Court Exhaustion Doctrine
Although the Supreme Court in Strate narrowed the earlier decisions of
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual recognizing tribes’ broad civil adjudicatory authority over non-Indians in Indian country,98 the Strate Court
also reaffirmed the continuing general efficacy of the tribal court exhaustion rule upheld in those earlier cases.99 In National Farmers, the
Court explained the importance of the exhaustion rule:
Our cases have often recognized that Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and
self-determination. That policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the
first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for
the challenge. Moreover, the orderly administration of
justice in the federal courts will be served by allowing a
full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before either
the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is
addressed. . . . Exhaustion of tribal court remedies . . . will
encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise
basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other
courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in
the event of further judicial review.100
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Regardless of the basis for jurisdiction, the federal policy
supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court
to stay its hand in order to give a tribal court a “full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.” In diversity cases,
as well as federal-question cases, unconditional access to
the federal forum would place it in direct competition with
the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter’s authority
over reservation affairs. Adjudication of such matters by
any nontribal court also infringes upon tribal lawmaking
authority, because tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.
. . . [P]roper respect for tribal legal institutions requires that they be given a “full opportunity” to consider
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The Supreme Court offered a similar endorsement of the requirement that parties exhaust tribal court civil remedies in Iowa Mutual:
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the issues before them and “to rectify any errors.” The federal policy of promoting tribal self-government encompasses the development of the entire tribal court system,
including appellate courts. At a minimum, exhaustion of
tribal remedies means that tribal appellate courts must
have the opportunity to review the determinations of the
lower tribal courts.101
In Strate, the Court insisted that the tribal court exhaustion requirement of National Farmers and Iowa Mutual is “a prudential exhaustion rule, in deference to the capacity of tribal courts to ‘explain to the
parties the precise basis for accepting [or rejecting] jurisdiction.’ ”102
While the Strate Court made this remark in rejecting the tribal petitioner’s argument that the “status”-based “implicit divestiture” theory of
Oliphant as expanded to tribes’ civil legislative authority in Montana does
not apply to tribes’ civil adjudicatory powers,103 this dictum nevertheless
shows that the Court continues to regard noninterference with tribes’
adjudicatory processes as crucial to the fulfillment of the federal “policy
of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination.”104
The Supreme Court created a narrow yet doctrinally troubling
exception to the tribal court exhaustion rule in the recent case of El
Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie (1999).105 Neztsosie addressed the issue of
whether a federal court must abstain, pursuant to the tribal court exhaustion rule, from deciding whether tribal common law claims brought
initially in tribal court and alleging injuries caused by on-reservation
corporate uranium mining operations qualify as federal “nuclear tort”
causes of action under the Price-Anderson Act.106 Determining whether
the tribal court claims were Price-Anderson “nuclear tort” claims, on
the one hand, or non-Price-Anderson (i.e., strictly tribal common law)
claims, on the other, was crucial in Neztsosie because of the federal district court’s nonappealed holding that the tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the latter but not the former.107 The Supreme Court
held that because a case raising the question of whether a legal claim is
a Price-Anderson “nuclear tort” claim would be subject to removal as a
matter of right if brought in state court, a federal court should not abstain from resolving this question, in deference to tribal court exhaustion, when the question is implicated in parallel proceedings initiated
previously in tribal court.108
On one level, the tediously technical Neztsosie decision makes
only a very minor intrusion into the tribal court exhaustion doctrine.
The Supreme Court itself stressed the narrowness of this “Neztsosie exception” to the exhaustion rule, underscoring the Price-Anderson Act’s
“unusual preemption provision” that “transforms into a federal action
‘any public liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident.’ ”109 Indeed, the Court suggested that “the existence of a federal

preemption defense [to the exercise of tribal jurisdiction] in the more
usual sense” would not require a reviewing federal court to suspend
application of the tribal court exhaustion requirement.110 The Court
explained:
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In view of this careful qualification of the Court’s decision not to
apply the exhaustion rule and the Court’s further endorsement of the
“prudential requirement of tribal exhaustion,”112 the Neztsosie exception
should be viewed as extremely narrow.
Still, Neztsosie is troubling because it reflects the Rehnquist Court’s
activism in limiting the scope of tribal rights in disregard of fundamental principles of Indian law. By invoking “congressional aims of speed
and efficiency”113 and Congress’s “unmistakable preference for a federal
forum”114 in passing the Price-Anderson Act, the Neztsosie Court effectively concealed the common law nature of its own judge-made exception to the tribal court exhaustion rule beneath a mantle of seemingly
statutory interpretation. Moreover, Neztsosie does not mention, let alone
give any weight to, the congressional “policy of supporting tribal selfgovernment and self-determination”115 underlying the tribal court exhaustion rule in “explaining” why the rule should not apply in this case.
Hence, instead of examining the Price-Anderson Act in light of a general, pervasive background policy of congressional respect for tribal
sovereignty in accordance with fundamental Indian law principles, the
Court declared that the Act’s “silence on [removal from] tribal courts”
amounted to nothing but “inadvertence,” musing further that “[n]ow
and then silence is not pregnant.”116
If the Court had been faithful to fundamental principles of Indian
law, the Court would have regarded the Act’s silence with respect
to tribal courts as “pregnant” with congressional intent to respect—or
at least not diminish—tribal rights, since congressional abandonment of
support for tribal rights requires an express showing of such intent.117
Viewed in this way, Neztsosie illustrates the Rehnquist Court’s tendency
to inject into its common law decision making a judicial policy choice
of extinguishing or limiting Indian rights while simultaneously attributing this anti-tribal choice to Congress.
Still, Neztsosie, like Strate, ostensibly reaffirms the tribal court exhaustion requirement, albeit in the context of another decision restricting
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Under normal circumstances, tribal courts, like state
courts, can and do decide questions of federal law, and
there is no reason to think that questions of federal preemption are any different. The situation here is the rare
one in which statutory provisions for conversion of state
claims to federal ones and removal to federal courts express congressional preference for a federal forum.111
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Indian rights. This observation—especially in view of the narrowness
of the Neztsosie exception—gives rise to cautious optimism that the Supreme Court will continue to uphold Congress’s policy of supporting
tribal courts through judicial enforcement of the tribal court exhaustion rule.118
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Additional Specific Legal Issues Facing Tribal Courts
Besides contending with new restrictions on inherent tribal adjudicatory authority in Indian country dictated by the Supreme Court and further constraints stemming from the Court’s narrow view of the meaning and extent of “Indian country,” Indian tribes today face a host of
additional complex legal issues in administering justice within reservation communities. The following is a nonexhaustive sampling of these
pressing issues. Each issue is described briefly, with an understanding
that the law pertaining to most of these issues is still in the early, formative stages of development. Needless to say, tribal courts will be at
the forefront of developing these and other cutting-edge legal issues in
the future.
Enforcement of judgments. Tribal courts increasingly face issues
about whether to enforce foreign judgments in tribal courts. This includes state court judgments and judgments of other tribal courts.119
This may occur, if at all, through tribal council legislation, adoption of
an applicable tribal court rule,120 or tribal judicial recognition of comity. Such decisions are strictly tribal in nature. There is no federal (or
state) law that requires tribal courts to recognize foreign judgments. It
is clearly a matter of tribal sovereignty.
Civil rights/separation of powers. As tribal government competence continues to grow, there will be (there already is) a concomitant
growth in the expectations of tribal citizens as to the level of performance they can expect from tribal officials and tribal institutions. As a result, there is likely to be an increase in litigation involving tribal official
and tribal government performance in such areas as civil rights, tribal
employment matters, and elections. The ability of tribal courts to resolve
these matters fairly and equitably is also a key ingredient in achieving a
proper balance of power within tribal government as a whole.
Sovereign immunity. An extraordinarily thorny and increasingly
prominent issue facing tribal courts is the extent of the immunity of
a sovereign government—tribal, federal, or state—from tribal judicial
process. Like all sovereigns, Indian tribes generally cannot be sued without their consent. Hence, in a suit against a tribe or tribal entity, tribal
courts must conduct a careful inquiry into such complex questions
as whether the tribe has waived its immunity, the scope of any existing
waiver of sovereign immunity, whether a tribe’s retained sovereign immunity shields individual tribal officers from judicial process or liabili-
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ty, and whether the tribe’s immunity has been abrogated by a federal
statute enacted pursuant to Congress’s “plenary power” in Indian affairs. Another set of difficult legal questions involves the amenability of
states and state officers to civil suits in tribal court for alleged violations
of federal or tribal law. These questions concerning the applicability of
state sovereign immunity in tribal court are likely to become increasingly important in the wake of several cases decided in recent years by
the United States Supreme Court insulating states and state officials
from both federal court and state court suits alleging violations of federal law, including federal law protective of Indian rights.121
Commercial law. There is no doubt that issues of commercial
law will continue to grow in significance within most, if not all, tribal
courts within the project region. This is a natural outcome of the varying levels of increased economic development and commercial activity
within this portion of Indian country. Much, but not all, of this activity
is both directly and indirectly a result of gaming activity within the
reservations.
As tribes as well as tribal members, nonmembers, and profitmaking-entities go forward ever more briskly in the business arena,
there will be (there already is) an increase in the borrowing of money
to serve as venture capital to support commercial endeavors as well
as the commerce generated by the business entities themselves that deliver the products and services. All of these endeavors raise the conventional issues related to secured (and unsecured) transactions, foreclosing on loans, the transfer of negotiable instruments, and the role of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) within the various tribal codes.
All of these issues are potentially complicated within the reservation
context because of the trust status of much tribal property, the enforcement and execution of judgments both on and off the reservation,
tribal sovereign immunity, and the cultural values at play in matters of
commerce.
Many of these issues are more legislative than judicial in nature,
but as with any legislation, especially legislation that is both new and
complex, litigation is likely if not inevitable. Since the stream of commerce within the reservation reflects elements of the pursuit and exercise of both economic and legal (political) sovereignty, there is no
doubt that tribal courts will be a central institution in establishing a
legal regime that fosters and enhances local commerce but with a sense
of equity and cultural sensitivity.
Although the pressures to adopt wholesale the commercial law—
especially the UCC—of the dominant society are considerable, it is
worth recalling—as in the federal/state context—that there is also
considerable legal and normative space for competing sovereigns to
approach issues differently but equitably. As elsewhere, there is the
not uncommon tension and challenge of clearly desiring economic
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development and commerce but seeking to regulate it within a context
of equity and appropriate cultural scale.
Criminal law and alternatives. While tribal courts will continue
to handle a large volume of criminal cases, there will be both renewed
and new effort, at least in part, to approach these cases through innovative means. These means will include the use of sentencing circles,
elder “peacemakers,” and alternatives to jail time as ways of pursuing a
restorative justice that works to heal the perpetrator, nurture the victim, and enhance the well-being of the entire community.
Administrative law. Administrative law is likely to be the fastest
growing area of law on most reservations. As tribes become increasingly active in such areas as alcohol and beverage control, gaming, environmental regulation, telecommunications and utilities, education and
elections, they will enact more and more administrative law. Such
activity will potentially raise questions of the substantive reach of such
legislation, the scope of administrative rule making, the governing
agency structure, the scope of agency adjudicatory authority, and judicial review. Tribal courts will be the primary forum for resolving such
questions.
Tribal tradition and custom (common law). Tribal courts will
continue their efforts to use tribal tradition and customs as key elements of a developing tribal common law used to resolve questions in
which there is no positive tribal law on point. The importance of tribal
common law is that it provides an important connection to long-held
cultural understandings that provide rules and guidance for resolving
significant disputes and conflicts on the reservation.
E S TA B L I S H M E N T O F G R E AT S I O U X N AT I O N
JUDICIAL SUPPORT CENTER
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Institutional Prerequisite for Establishing the Great Sioux
Nation Supreme Court
The primary project objective of establishing a Great Sioux Nation
Supreme Court is of such significant legal and cultural magnitude that
it calls for careful analysis and reflection, particularly in understanding
the movement and transition from what is to what (potentially) will be.
New institutions, if they are to be successful, need foundations of support and understanding that will nurture and encourage their success.
Without a solid foundation, any new situation is likely to totter and fall
with the slightest pressure or shift in the wind.
Just as the various state supreme courts and the United States
Supreme Court carry out their responsibilities with an adequate staff and
reliable infrastructure, so must it be for the Great Sioux Nation Supreme

Court. The locus and identification of this infrastructure would be in the
establishment of the Great Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center. As
the name implies, the Center would provide a range of support activities for existing tribal courts; develop several specialized projects related to legislative drafting, constitutional revision and economic development as they pertain to the development of institutions and law on
the several reservations; and implement a strong research and administrative base for the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court itself. This cluster of activities contains the potential for establishing an innovative
model and paradigm to link together a series of important judicial and
law-related activities within a historically resonant and culturally sensitive context. This has never been done before in Indian country.
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A necessary ingredient of many, if not all, of the projects listed above is
the availability of an adequate research base. This would require the
establishment of a Great Sioux Nation Indian Law Library that would
include a complete and thoroughly cataloged collection of the treaties,
constitutions, codes, compilations of custom and tradition, and judicial
decisions of the participating tribes. In addition, there should be representative examples of all of these classes of documents selected from
other tribal efforts around the country.
It goes without saying that such a library is critical to any effort to
enhance the quality of judicial decision making and the development of
law within the project area. Very few, if any, of the participating tribes
currently have anything approaching an adequate law library, and certainly the proposed Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court cannot proceed or succeed without one. Wherever possible these resources should
be made available on-line so that participating tribal courts can avail
themselves of this information rapidly without actually traveling to the
library or using the cumbersome mail system currently in place.
This collection—ideally at least—should be supplemented in several ways. The library needs an adequate “federal” component given
the substantial, even dominating, role federal law plays in Indian law
even at the tribal court level. This part of the collection would include
respective sets of United States Reports (U.S.), Federal Reporter (F., F.2d,
F.3d), Federal Supplement (F. Supp.), United States Code Annotated
(U.S.C.A.), Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), and United States
Code Congressional and Administrative News (U.S.C.C.A.N.). It should
also be supplemented by representative codes and constitutions of
other tribes across the United States and an ongoing subscription to
the Indian Law Reporter. Finally, it should be supplemented—where
possible—with tribal histories and other archival materials related to
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oral tradition and custom. The latter might be developed in conjunction
with the efforts already undertaken by the tribal colleges on many of
the reservations.
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Great Sioux Nation Indian Law Research Component
Inevitably, the much discussed research needs to be done by someone. As
described elsewhere, the project does not (or ought not) envision the
relevant research to be performed by tribal judges themselves. It is in
this vein that the project proposes the establishment of a Great Sioux
Nation judicial research fellow to perform much of this work.
The Great Sioux Nation judicial research fellow (or fellows, as
the case may be) ideally would perform a number of functions. The primary fellow would do research as directed by the chief justice to develop appropriate memoranda pertinent to cases before the Court. In
addition—on a directed basis—the fellow could engage in research for
participating tribal courts at the trial and/or (if preserved) intermediate
appellate level. This research undoubtedly would facilitate a reduction
in the time that it would take to decide cases as well as an improvement
in the quality of those decisions. Timely and thorough research is a
critical variable in the administration of justice within any judicial system and certainly cannot be overlooked in the context of the Great
Sioux Nation Supreme Court.
In addition to spending some time at the University of South
Dakota School of Law doing this significant research, the fellow also
would teach a one-credit special topics class within the field of advanced Indian law at the law school. This would present law students at
the University of South Dakota with a unique opportunity for advanced, specialized learning within the field of Indian law. In turn, the
(at least part-time) presence of the fellow at the law school would
greatly enhance the stature of the institution. In addition, the availability of the teaching component for the fellow would likely broaden the
pool of applicants for the fellow position because it would contain
both research and teaching elements that are so attractive to the best
and the brightest of recent law school graduates.
In addition to these primary research and teaching activities, the
judicial research fellow could be detailed to perform other research
and administrative tasks. The necessity for other kinds of research and
writing is elaborated below.122 More than likely, however, will be the
need for an additional fellow (or two!) to undertake and sustain these
complementary projects. The fellow(s) could also have as a responsibility the duty to establish research and intern opportunities for law
students both during the academic year and during the summer. This
would greatly increase the capacity of the Center and provide unique
and exceptional opportunities for students. This is especially signifi-

cant with the increasing number of Indian and other interested students at the University of South Dakota and the University of North
Dakota law schools.
Great Sioux Nation Law and Culture Journal
A natural outgrowth of the various projects might be a strictly scholarly endeavor tentatively identified as the Great Sioux Nation Law and
Culture Journal. This journal might be coordinated through the University of South Dakota School of Law and a tribal college, such as
Sinte Gleska University, and would serve to highlight the legal and
cultural issues that develop within the project area as they are reflected
in the Court and/or within the tribal communities themselves.
Such a journal would also provide a potential medium for exploring issues identified within other components of the Reconciliation
Project, including repatriation, commerce, and community mediation.
All of this in its broadest form might engender important scholarly and
community dialogue about reconciliation and the cultural, political,
and economic interactions among Indians and non-Indians, including
the respective governmental institutions.
In any event, such a journal may be the ideal vehicle for extending the efforts of the diverse project undertakings to a larger statewide
and even national community of individuals interested both personally
and professionally in these issues. In its own curious way, the journal
might represent a bicultural approach to the theme of “contact” and interaction as initially witnessed in the journals of Lewis and Clark. The
journal might serve as an adjunct or catalyst in the ongoing—often
painful—process of contemporary “contact” and interaction.
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This project—while not judicial in nature—possesses great merit and
has much good to offer. Tribes today, including the tribes within the
project area, are (for better or worse) enacting more law than ever before in the modern era. This trend is not likely to abate. As the federal
government and various state governments continue to pass more and
more laws to keep up with the demands of an ever more complex society, a parallel proliferation of lawmaking is occurring at the tribal level.
Much litigation that follows the enactment of these myriad laws is directly traceable to the poor draftsmanship reflected in the contested
statutes and ordinances. This is especially true at the tribal level where
attorneys are not always available for such tasks and/or often do not
supply the textual nuance and detail necessary for avoiding much legal
wrangling and litigation.
The importance of good legislative drafting is severalfold. As
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noted, it can help to avoid costly, time-consuming, and fractious litigation, but on the more positive side, it can encourage harmony, political
integrity, and respect for law as a valuable social and cultural embodiment of significant tribal values. In addition, while there is no doubt
that the amount of law on the reservation is increasing, it is also true
that much of the new tribal legislation—from water codes to the Uniform Commercial Code to cultural preservation and repatriation—is
increasingly complex. This factor of growing complexity also ratchets
up the demand for improved and more thoughtful legislative drafting.
Such efforts as the Legislative Drafting Project are innovative in
that they seek to establish a more holistic approach to the making and
development of law than is attainable with a narrow judicial focus. This
is one instance where an undue formalistic emphasis on the separation
of legislative, executive, and judicial functions can do more harm than
good. None of this, of course, is meant to suggest an obliteration of the
time-honored distinctions embedded in the concept of separation of
powers, but only to suggest that the greatest effectiveness and renown
will attend to the project that can blend the old and the new to usher in
the best of all possible worlds.
The Legislative Drafting Project has at least two other benefits.
First, given the makeup of the tribes within the project area, there is
great likelihood that two or more tribes will be considering identical
substantive problems at the same time, and hence a greater efficiency
and potential unity will result. Second, concern for the absence of appropriate financial resources within many tribes to employ counsel to research and draft desired legislation permits this particular project to provide a most needed service at little or no cost to the participant tribes.
In some cases, there may even be the opportunity to draft model
legislation on diverse topics ranging from cultural preservation and
repatriation to the execution of judgments that would help meet the
needs of more than one reservation within the project region and even
nationally. Most certainly, no such project currently exists anywhere in
the country, and the time is indeed ripe for such an innovative effort.
This is one of potential projects that not only meets a well-recognized
need but pushes beyond it and takes things to another level.
Great Sioux Nation Constitution Revision Project
One of the major tribal legal developments of the past decade or so has
been the serious commitment of many tribes to revisit their tribal constitutions with an eye to considering their adequacy for the present
and future and, more specifically, to envisioning what kinds of amendments are necessary or appropriate. This movement is significant in
both obvious and perhaps not so obvious ways. Any time a sovereign
considers amending or altering its constitution it signals a political/
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cultural perception about the need for change. This is both exciting
and risky business.
In addition, in the context of Indian law, this recent movement
for constitutional reform indicates a growing concern by tribes about
both the legitimacy and substantive soundness of pivotal governing
documents, which in many cases were adopted pursuant to the often
heavy-handed influence of the Bureau of Indian Affairs exercised pursuant to section 17 of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act.123 Many
IRA, and even non-IRA, constitutions are essentially boilerplate versions designed by the BIA without any real participation by the tribes
themselves. Therefore they often lack the true stamp of tribal ownership and legitimacy. Coupled with these problematic origins, there are
often questions relating to substance in such critical areas as territory, jurisdiction, membership, powers of the legislative and executive
branches, status of the tribal judiciary, balance of power (separation of
powers), and relationship to the federal government.
This Constitution Revision Project is one that holds much potential. For example, such a framework would encourage the collection
of tribal constitutions of all types—both IRA and non-IRA—especially
constitutions adopted in recent years, as well as relevant tribal cultural
and constitutional histories. With such a collection in place, a workshop might be conducted to review the options and choices tribes have
made both historically and in recent times.
In addition, the project could also develop a short pamphlet that
discusses constitutional adoption, revision, and amendment procedures
that reflect both IRA and tribal (i.e., non-IRA) approaches to this question. Besides a description of the technical steps, such a document could
address the importance of participation by tribal people in this process
itself through informed discussion at the community level up to and including the calling of a tribal constitutional convention.
Lastly, there should be the opportunity to consider tribal constitutions not only in terms of structure, substance, and procedure but
also in the framework of values and aspirations. What are the values
and aspirations that tribes want to see embedded and identified in their
constitutions? Unfortunately, too much discussion of tribal constitutional revision focuses on technical matters of structure and procedure
(which of course are important) and not on the values constitutions seek
to realize and the aspirations they seek to vindicate. There is not only
the constitutional text but also its supertext that makes clear its connection to tribal values and culture. Finally, the project would be available to assist in the more obvious task of drafting relevant amendments
or entire constitutions for interested tribes, and perhaps even to prepare a “model” tribal constitution—not as any prepackaged answer but
as a vehicle to generate and support tribal constitutional discussion.
Of course, it goes without saying that any of the workshop’s
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potential activities could be performed on-site on any reservation within
the project area. Constitutional discussion and revision is likely to be
one of the primary vehicles for tribal “reform” in this new century. Therefore it seems timely for the supportive involvement of the Great Sioux
Nation Judicial Support Center in these efforts. This is yet another
example of an opportunity for the project to be not merely helpful in a
judicial sense but to be truly innovative in working with tribes not only
at the center but at the cutting edge of the use and syntax of law.
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Great Sioux Nation Law and Economic
Development Project
Outside the strict confines of law, but nevertheless deeply embedded
in it, is the struggle and commitment of tribes to advance economic development within their reservations. Economic development, despite
being often discussed in blind imitative reference to the majoritarian
society, is a frontline issue for most tribes as they seek to address the
extensive poverty that exists throughout Indian country, but particularly in the project area. With four of the poorest counties in the United
States located in this part of Indian country, the need for economic development is painfully obvious.
Whether poverty and unemployment are analyzed through the
more conventional lens of attracting outside business and capital to the
reservation or from the vantage point of an indigenous approach of encouraging local efforts that are modest but culturally consonant, questions of tribal policy and law inevitably need to be addressed. These
questions include such things as the role of the tribe as an active participant and player in economic activity; the nature of the law governing
corporate, partnership, and limited partnership efforts within a reservation; the role (if any) of sovereign immunity; Indian preference in
hiring and promotion; taxation; jurisdiction; and the match of tribal
law to the primary rules of commerce outside the reservation, such as
the Uniform Commercial Code.
These questions are not academic or futuristic but pragmatic and
real. The incredible jumpstart (however modest the results to date) of
Indian gaming has brought many of these issues to the forefront of
tribal governmental and judicial concern. In fact, it is likely true in some
cases that the speed of potential economic change itself has presented
new opportunities and challenges to tribes that only a short time ago
would have been inconceivable. For example, it is difficult to envision
the partnership of Bell Farms, Inc., and the Rosebud Sioux Tribe to create the largest hog farm in the western hemisphere without the experience of Indian gaming as a precedent for large capital investments for
joint ventures of considerable economic complexity. This large-scale
example is provided neither to applaud nor to criticize, but merely to
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illustrate the rapidly changing and evolving terrain of tribal economic
development.
Much of this kind of development involves not only the type of
legal issues described above, but also questions of values, culture, and
economic theory. It is in the interweave of these questions with policy
and law that such a Law and Economic Development Project could be
particularly useful in parsing the competing demands and the myriad
options that go with it. In this area, tribes may seek assistance that goes
beyond the strictly legal and delves into the realm of economic analysis, infrastructure capability, and environmental impact. Many tribes
currently lack the resources to make these assessments on their own,
and the Law and Economic Development Project would be an invaluable asset in this regard.
In addition, the Law and Economic Development Project would
be a valuable force to produce informative case studies of economic development efforts in Indian country in order to try to identify the most
likely mix of leadership, law, and culture that maximizes economic advancement. In the economic development arena, the question of how
one replicates success (one’s own or someone else’s) is a core concern
that could be profitably explicated within the mission of such an effort.
Tribal economic sovereignty and self-determination are obvious
complements to tribal political sovereignty and self-determination. In
fact, it might be argued that without companion economic development, meaningful self-determination cannot grow because economic
constraints and lack of resources make it nearly impossible to realize
these legal and cultural benefits. With this in mind, the Law and Economic Development Project makes eminently good sense with its realization that advancements in tribal government are more likely to occur,
flourish, and become long-lasting when they rest on a secure economic
base. This is another example where the potential of the Reconciliation
Project—particularly the Great Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center—
to be innovative and truly responsive to the needs of the tribes within
the project area is quite real. It is further likely that the participating
tribes will manifest a deeper sense of commitment and ownership of
the Judicial Support Center because of its very willingness to push beyond the merely pedestrian to something that strikes a spark for genuine change and dialectical encounter.
Without the establishment of a Great Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center to provide assistance to existing tribal courts while establishing infrastructure support for the Great Sioux Nation Supreme
Court itself and creating some innovative related projects, it is quite
unlikely that the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court will truly take
root and blossom. The proposed Center advances the likelihood of
meaningful success and reduces the likelihood of outright failure or
mediocrity.
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The idea for a Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court is an exciting and
long-held cultural ideal and vision of the tribes of the Great Sioux
Nation that is fully embraced and promoted by the Reconciliation
Project. It is a concept that has been around since the beginning within
this part of Indian country as a potential capstone effort that would
establish a kind of (renewed) cultural and legal continuity within the
historical Great Sioux Nation as recognized, for example, in the Fort
Laramie Treaties of 1851 and 1868. This point—which on some level is
quite obvious—needs to be reiterated in order to avoid potential problems about the roots and lineage of this legal milestone. Nothing can
dissipate support for a project more quickly than wrangling about
whose idea it really is.
In this vein it is probably best to understand the project as facilitating the realization of a long-held historical and cultural ideal in
accordance with tribal participation and leadership to cooperatively
operationalize this long-held tribal vision. With this in mind, what follows is a preliminary effort to identify and discuss the relevant questions in order to facilitate implementation of the Great Sioux Nation
Supreme Court. These issues are the quintessential core questions that
need to be answered in order to establish an adequate legal foundation
from which to operationalize this historical endeavor. The ensuing discussion is meant simply to raise the issues, to suggest the options and
range of choices, and then at some later time (as directed) to flesh out
comprehensive, particularized details and suggested courses of action.

The very first consideration is identifying who are the eligible tribes to
participate in the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court. This is a not insignificant question, but one on which rests a baseline legitimacy. A
Court calling itself the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court (or Sioux
Nation Supreme Court) must indeed represent the Great Sioux Nation.
At this time there are at least three possibilities:
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Composition (Participating Tribes)

1. All the Sioux tribes within the current project area
of South Dakota, North Dakota, and Nebraska. This
would include eleven tribes: nine tribes in South
Dakota and one each in North Dakota and Nebraska.
They are:
a. South Dakota: Rosebud, Oglala (Pine Ridge),
Cheyenne River, Standing Rock, Lower Brule,
Crow Creek, Yankton, Flandreau, and Sisseton
(Lake Traverse)

b. North Dakota: Spirit Lake
c. Nebraska: Santee
2. The tribes that are signatories of the Fort Laramie
Treaties of 1851 and 1868. These tribes are often referred to as the Great Sioux Nation within the treaties
and related litigation. They are eight in number and include Rosebud, Oglala (Pine Ridge), Cheyenne River,
Standing Rock, Lower Brule, Crow Creek, Santee Sioux
of Nebraska, and Fort Peck Sioux in Montana.
3. All tribes that are recognized as Sioux. This would include all the tribes in numbers 1 and 2 and the following tribes in Minnesota: Lower Sioux Reservation (Morton, Minnesota), Upper Sioux Reservation (Granite
Falls, Minnesota) Prairie Island Settlement (near Red
Wing, Minnesota), and Prior Lake Reservation (near
Mankato, Minnesota).
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The next logical structural and organizational question is: What is to
be the relationship of the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court to existing tribal appellate courts? One view appears to be that the newly
formed Court should simply replace all existing tribal appellate structures with one superstructure. This is problematic for several reasons.
Such an approach would create a veritable tidal wave of appeals—of all
kinds—for the new Court to consider. This wave might well swamp
the Court before it ever got started. Also, it would not really be a qualitative move forward but more of a new replacement for those already
existing tribal courts of appeals. While there is some argument to be
made in this vein as establishing a broader band of legal uniformity
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In addition, several tribal bands in Canada are recognized as
Sioux. These include the Bird Tail, Sioux Valley, and Sioux Village in
Manitoba; and the Standing Buffalo, Moose Woods, Round Plain, and
Wood Mountain in Saskatchewan.
This question concerning the composition of the Great Sioux
Nation Supreme Court raises the foundational question about who determines which tribes are invited to participate in the formation of the
Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court. If the Historical Society is to do
this, it is unlikely to have the necessary historical and cultural expertise. Perhaps a certain core group of Sioux tribes such as the Sioux
tribes in South Dakota or the signatories to the Fort Laramie Treaty of
1868 might be asked to take on this responsibility. It is definitely a
threshold question that must be answered and will likely set the tone
for the entire project.
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across the legal horizon of the participating tribes, this very same effort can be accomplished by a Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court that
does not replace existing tribal courts of appeals and at the same time
preserves a significant amount of legal space for tribal diversity within
noncontroversial areas of the law.
The structural question is also closely related to the issue of the
Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, which is discussed
below.124 The essential point of a Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court is
not necessarily to decide routine cases of local import, but rather to decide cases that have significant import across the Sioux Nation as a
whole. Here an analogy to the United States Supreme Court is instructive. The United States Supreme Court hears only those cases that
have national import and/or that involve conflicts between different
circuit courts of appeals or between a circuit court of appeals and a
state supreme court. It does not exist to ultimately resolve questions of
local application if there are no broad implications or conflicts with
other local forums. It is properly understood as an institution of history
instrumental in reflecting and articulating the accomplishments and aspirations of law.
For all of these reasons, it is clear—despite the reality of a more
complex structural and procedural system—that the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court should not simply replace existing tribal appellate
courts. This would likely be a step backward rather than forward. The
challenge is not to avoid the attendant complexity but to master
and transcend it in order to achieve a new level of jurisprudence and
historical/cultural continuity.
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Qualifications and Selection of Justices
Both the qualifications of justices for the Great Sioux Nation Supreme
Court and the method of selecting them present a significant range of
possibilities. Most tribal appellate courts in the project region require
that a majority, if not all, of appellate judges be formally law-trained
and admitted to practice law in some state or federal jurisdiction. In addition, some appellate courts require a certain amount of experience.
Some appellate courts require that at least one member of the court
speak the (tribal) language and be knowledgeable about tribal tradition
and culture. Usually such a member of the court does not have to be
law-trained. Almost all tribal appellate systems in the region have
three-member courts. The Rosebud Sioux Supreme Court has six members, but sits in three-judge panels with an en banc capacity. The
Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals sits in panels with one
judge from each participating tribe. Almost all tribes follow officially
or unofficially Indian or tribal preference in the selection of judges.
This range of possibilities reveals a clear trend toward requiring that

Enabling Legislation and Judicial Rules
The transforming legal event in establishing the Great Sioux Nation
Supreme Court will be the adoption of (uniform) enabling legislation
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tribal judges be law-trained and admitted to practice, with some concern about explicitly guaranteeing some representation by individuals
who know the language and culture. Resolution of this critical issue
clearly requires more study and tribal consultation.
Depending on the number of participating tribes—which potentially runs as high as eleven or twelve—there may be some concern
that a Court of so many justices is unwieldy. It is true, however, that
many international courts have as many or even more sitting justices. At
this stage, the potential problem is simply identified.
The actual selection of the justices by the participating tribes involves several possibilities. One is simply to leave it to the respective
tribes’ discretion. The other is to mandate a uniform process such as
selection/appointment by the tribal council or selection as part of a tribewide election. The latter process is obviously more time-consuming and
raises questions about how one gets on the ballot, eligibility to vote,
costs, etc. Obviously, the uniform federal practice is by appointment,
while the state practice is often a mixture of initial appointment and
subsequent reelection. Tribal approaches include both appointment
and election. The use of an election procedure involving so many separate tribes appears quite cumbersome, but perhaps that is insufficient to
rule it out.
Another obvious issue is the duration of office. Likely term possibilities are four, six, or eight years. Two-year or even three-year terms
appear too short to allow the Court to establish roots, consistency, and
the necessary rules that face any court in its initial steps of development. On the other end, lifetime appointments are possible, but are
not currently used by any tribe within the Sioux Nation. Yet perhaps
the importance and historical significance of the Great Sioux Nation
Supreme Court suggest the necessity of a stronger consideration of
this possibility.
Other concerns in this area include adopting a process to stagger
the terms of the justices (obviated if subject to lifetime appointments)
to avoid continuity problems, selection of a chief justice (presumably
elected by fellow justices) and her or his term of office. And finally there
is need for provisions (substantively and procedurally) for impeachment and removal from office and the selection of judicial successors.
Details about these options and procedures can be spelled out in further
detail once the project and the participating tribes winnow down the
range of choices to perhaps one or two possibilities. It does not make a
good deal of sense to get out a comprehensive blueprint at this point.
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by the participating tribes. Adoption of this enabling legislation will
officially establish the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court and inaugurate the process for the selection of judges and, ultimately, the process
for hearing and deciding cases. Such legislation—as this part of the report indicates—must identify the rules and principles to govern in at
least six areas of concern, namely, composition of the Court, qualifications and selection of justices, relationship to existing tribal appellate
systems, jurisdiction, governing law, and enforcement of judgments.
While such enabling legislation cannot be expected to answer
every structural and/or procedural question, it must answer enough
questions so that the Court can become operational. At the same time,
it is probably fruitless to leave all of this up to the Court itself without
sufficient legal guidance or direction. In this vein, it is therefore necessary to explicitly identify and recognize the ability of the Court to
adopt judicial rules to meet situations not identified by the enabling legislation. These rules would be largely procedural in nature and would
mainly serve as gap fillers. All tribal courts in the project area currently
possess some form of judicial rule-making authority. This is particularly necessary in the context of establishing appellate rules of procedure
governing such items as timelines, length of briefs, the granting of oral
argument, etc.
In a related context, it is necessary that the Court be given the
appropriate authority to regulate the admission to practice before the
Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court. Again, the most common approach
of the tribal courts in the project area includes requiring that practitioners be admitted to practice in federal court and/or the highest
court of a state. A few tribes—notably the Rosebud Sioux Tribe—
require that a candidate for admission successfully pass a tribal law
examination. In addition, most tribes permit “tribal advocates” or “lay
advocates”—usually identified as individuals who are tribal members
and who possess minimal education requirements (usually a high school
diploma)—to practice before tribal courts. It is a legitimate issue
whether this classification of practitioners should be eligible to practice before the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court. This is particularly
true in the appellate context where the ability to write a brief is absolutely essential.
In addition, there are the complementary issues of regulating the
ability of litigants to proceed pro se and enabling the Court to appoint
pro bono counsel to represent indigent pro se litigants. This latter issues
raises important questions about ensuring quality representation for
litigants in the context of such a historical undertaking. Therefore some
additional discussion is needed in this context.
It makes sense—and necessarily follows—that on the practice
side what naturally flows from the issue of admission to practice before
the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court is the importance and viability
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Perhaps the penultimate question for any court—especially a tribal or
intertribal court enmeshed in the uncertainties of much of contemporary Indian law—concerns what kinds of cases (appeals) the court has
jurisdiction to hear and whether such jurisdiction is discretionary or
mandatory in nature. Therefore two questions arise, each to be discussed in turn: (1) How shall the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court
exercise its jurisdiction? and (2) What is the nature or scope of the
Court’s jurisdiction?
Exercise of jurisdiction. This inquiry—at least at this stage—may
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of establishing a Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court Bar Association.
The importance of such a bar association is not only that it will encourage face-to-face esprit among practitioners about their commitment to
the quality and success of the Court but, in addition, it can perform a
range of services, from processing applications for admission to practice and providing continuing legal education (CLE) opportunities, to
developing membership lists for pro bono appointments, to handling
most disciplinary matters. The successful discharge of these functions
will greatly advance the likelihood that the Great Sioux Nation Supreme
Court will establish a wide swath of legitimacy and a broad range of
competence. Historically, bar associations have been critical partners
of the judicial infrastructure in the effort to advance judicial legitimacy
and also to provide a set of significant services that otherwise would
overburden courts or go undone altogether.
With these advantages in mind, it is definitely advisable that the
establishment of a Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court Bar Association
go hand-in-hand with the creation of a Great Sioux Nation Supreme
Court. This, of course, is likely to involve developing a separate set of
administrative rules identifying the conditions of membership, procedures for electing officers, and the range and scope of activities,
whether mandatory or discretionary, encompassed within the bar association’s statement of purpose. Without such a bar association, the ability of the Court to obtain legitimacy and to flourish will be severely
constrained.
In sum, the enabling legislation adopted by the participating
tribes must set out the broad principles governing the structure of the
Court in such matters as the qualifications and selection of justices, requirements for admission to practice, establishment of a bar association, and explicit authorization for adopting judicial rules needed for
regulating local practice and advancing the administration of justice.
In addition, there are the weighty substantive concerns relative to jurisdiction, governing law, and enforcement of judgment. These discussions follow.
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be broadly conceived as whether the Court’s jurisdiction is mandatory
or discretionary or some combination thereof; or, to put it from the
perspective of the litigants, whether a party may appeal as a matter of
right (in which case the Court must hear the appeal), or only as a matter
of discretion (or, in United States Supreme Court parlance, through a
petition for a writ of certiorari), or some combination thereof. It seems
highly unlikely that either extreme—all cases being appealable as a
matter of right or no cases being appealable as a matter of right—would
be appropriate. The former (especially with preservation of current
tribal appellate courts as intermediate courts of appeals) would likely overburden the Court with too many rather routine or mundane appeals.
The latter would allow the Court to avoid cases (although such avoidance would be unlikely) considered too controversial or politically
volatile and might appear to give the Court too much power to set its
own docket.
The test is how to strike a balance or middle ground. This middle ground might identify a range of cases appealable as a matter of
right with all others appealable on a discretionary or writ of certiorari
basis. While it is clearly difficult to array the possibilities, perhaps
an initial grouping suggests that cases involving challenges to tribal
jurisdiction, civil rights (e.g., due process/equal protection claims),
election disputes, and commercial issues would be characterized as
appealable of right, with all other cases deemed matters of discretion.
This apportionment is provided as a mere example of a baseline for
further discussion.
Scope of jurisdiction. This inquiry clearly overlaps the first, but
is more directly involved with what is appealable (whether mandatory
or discretionary) in the first instance or otherwise within the Court’s
purview. This concern raises questions such as the existence or scope
of interlocutory appeals, whether the Court will have any original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs, and whether the Court will have
a certification procedure to respond to inquiries about questions of law
from federal, state, or other tribal judiciaries.
Existing tribal appellate courts run the gamut on these matters.
Some say yes; some say no; while others are silent in whole or in part.
Most state courts and the federal courts recognize some kind of interlocutory appeals procedure and usually do possess some limited form
of original jurisdiction. A few have provisions for certification.
Obviously these issues need to be explored in more detail. Yet it
goes without saying that a central tenet of legitimacy and stability is
consensus and common understanding about the scope of an appellate
tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction and the procedural devices available
to invoke that jurisdiction. Potential confusion or inconsistency in this
realm clearly threatens stability and therefore a most careful consideration of these jurisdictional issues is crucial.
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The issue of what is to be the appropriate governing law presents some
provocative and sticky questions. While ordinarily a tribal court (or
even an intertribal court) simply applies the appropriate federal and/or
tribal law to resolve the dispute, the Great Sioux Nation Supreme
Court, as a court made up of related but autonomous tribal nations,
faces the issue of whether to simply apply the law of the tribe from
which the appeal comes or whether the Court may use federal or tribal
law principles that differ from the local law of the tribe in order to fashion a more encompassing or appropriate result. This is further complicated by the fact that in a given case or related cases from two different
participating tribes an identical legal question may suggest two different
results because, for the example, the tribes have different ordinances or
constitutional provisions.
This issue suggests a broad jurisprudential concern. Is it to be an
objective of the Court to articulate, wherever possible, broad synthesizing principles and interpretations that establish rules and precedents
that are binding across the Great Sioux Nation, or else to merely decide cases in accordance with the local law of the particular tribe without concern for broader implications or possible conflicts with the law
of another constituent tribe? This is not unlike the broad issue of contemporary federalism in discerning those parameters of federal and
state authority between the poles of uniformity and variance. Yet there
is a cardinal difference in the analogy because the United States Constitution provides the broad template for deciding federal-state zones
of authority. There is, of course, no Great Sioux Nation Constitution
to set the broad parameters.
Perhaps there is a middle ground to provide a baseline for this
discussion as well. The middle ground might be that cases that are
decided on rules of federal law—whether constitutional, statutory, or
Supreme Court precedent—would be binding across the Sioux Nation,
while cases decided on local tribal law—whether constitutional, statutory, customary and traditional, or common law—would be binding
only on the affected tribe. Of course, even these categories may overlap and intersect, but they certainly do provide a basis for making some
initial, workable distinctions.
In turn, this discussion raises an overarching policy and values
question about the Great Sioux Nation’s conception of its Supreme
Court: Is the objective uniformity, diversity, or a principled blend of
both? Again, there is no right or wrong way, but there is a need for
a consensus view in order to avoid a breach of commitment to the Supreme Court stemming from a misconception or misunderstanding of
the Court’s purpose. No final decision is possible without additional
discussion of this matter.
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Enforcement of Judgments
It goes without saying that any judgment of the Court is enforceable
by its terms within the territory of the participating tribes. Any judgment of the Court is the “supreme law” of the Great Sioux Nation, not
subject to a countermand failure to enforce by any participating tribe.
Failure by anyone within the nation to honor the judgments of the
Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court will only precipitate a crisis of legitimacy and potentially cause the jurisprudential walls to come crumbling down.
There are other less clear variations on the theme of enforcement of judgments that will need to be addressed. These include, for
example, (1) whether judgments of the individual participating tribal
courts are to be automatically entitled to full faith and credit in the
courts of other participating tribes or whether this is to be decided on a
tribe-by-tribe basis; and (2) whether there should be a uniform rule of
full faith and credit or comity or complete deference to each participating tribe’s policy for the enforcement of state judgments or judgments of nonparticipating tribal courts. Of course, there is the routine
procedural question about whether actions for the enforcement of
judgments may be brought as an original action in the Great Sioux
Nation Supreme Court (presumably not). These issues clearly raise significant policy questions that need to be explored in greater detail by
the participating tribes.
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CONCLUSION: BOTH PLAN AND DREAM

Inevitably, establishment of the Great Sioux Nation Supreme Court—
a cultural dream of long-standing—raises issues of values and practicality, aspiration, and operationalization, and all the potentialities in between. This report strives to provide sufficient background discussion
of relevant Indian law issues, discussion of the desired infrastructure of
a Great Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center, and elucidation of the
particular issues that need additional discussion and resolution before
the Court can begin its historical mission with confidence and legitimacy. The authors are prepared for—indeed anticipate—the opportunity to discuss the report with all interested parties in order to facilitate
identification, understanding, and support for the next phase in this
unique and groundbreaking process.
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This report is the product of an endeavor of the University of South Dakota
School of Law under a research grant
from the Wakpa Sica Historical Society
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of Fort Pierre, South Dakota. Since
drafting the report, the authors have
helped the Historical Society conduct
a series of tribal roundtable discussions

2 See, e.g., Frank Pommersheim,
Braid of Feathers (1995); Judith
Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: PostExhaustion Review of Tribal Court
Decisions, 46 Kan. L. Rev. 251
(1998).
3 Frank Pommersheim, John LaVelle,
and B. J. Jones. All of these individuals are well-known scholars,
teachers, and practitioners in the
field of Indian law. The tribe-bytribe needs assessment/survey was
prepared for the Wakpa Sica Historical Society by B. J. Jones of
the University of North Dakota
School of Law and submitted separately (draft on file with authors).
4 “Establishment of Great Sioux
Nation Judicial Support Center.”
5 See, e.g., the services described
in the section “Establishment of
Great Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center.”
6 See the section “Establishment of
Great Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center.”
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7 See, e.g., the needs assessment/
survey prepared by B. J. Jones of
the University of North Dakota
School of Law (on file with the
Wakpa Sica Historical Society).
8 See, e.g., extended discussion in
the section “Legal Issues Facing
Tribal Courts.”
9 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6).
10 Currently, within the project area,
only the Rosebud Sioux Tribe has
a functioning bar association that
administers a tribal bar examination and provides limited CLE
opportunities.
11 See Special Message to the Congress on
Indian Affairs, [1970] Pub. Papers
564 (Richard M. Nixon).
12 Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Court
Jurisprudence: A Snapshot from the
Field, 21 Vt. L. Rev. 7, 7 (1996).
13 See, e.g., Indian Tribal Justice Act,
25 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3602, 3611 to
3614, 3621, 3631.
14 John P. LaVelle, Sanctioning a
Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex parte
Young,Expansion of Hans Immunity, and
Denial of Indian Rights in Coeur d’Alene
Tribe, 31 Ariz. St. L. J. 787, 789
(1999).
15 See Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of
Federal Indian Law 232 (Rennard
Strickland et al., eds., 1982)
[hereinafter Cohen’s Handbook]
(discussing the independent origin of tribal sovereignty).
16 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 604–05
(1823) (non-Indian plaintiffs who
purported to obtain ownership of
land by grant from Indian tribes
did “not exhibit a title which can
be sustained in the Courts of the
United States”).
17 See id. at 573–605 (discussing application of the “discovery” doctrine to the question of Indian
title).
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1 For an important previous effort
at addressing some of these issues,
see Draft Articles of the Sioux
Nation Supreme Court prepared
by Steven C. Emery, Steven J.
Gunn, and Thomas J. Van Norman
for the Dakota Territory Chairmen’s Council, October 24, 1997
(on file with authors).
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in South Dakota and North Dakota for
the purpose of refining and elaborating
the Reconciliation Place Project to integrate tribal people’s observations and
concerns. The authors expect to issue
a supplemental report reflecting this
input in the future.
The authors would like to acknowledge and thank Dean Barry R.
Vickrey of USD School of Law for
advice and support in completing the
report; USD law student Sharon Red
Deer, J.D. 2002, for research assistance;
and USD School of Law Senior Secretary Mary Ann Hart for data processing
and technical support.
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18 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831)
(holding that “an Indian tribe or
nation within the United States is
not a foreign state in the sense of
the constitution”).
19 Id. at 17.
20 See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542, 557,
559–63 (1832).
21 Id. at 561.
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22 See, e.g., id. at 559–60 (“We have
applied [the words ‘treaty’ and
‘nation’] to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of
the earth. They are applied to all
in the same sense.”); Cherokee Nation,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16 (“The acts of
our government plainly recognize
the Cherokee nation as a state,
and the courts are bound by those
acts.”).
23 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) at 17–18 (denying Indian
tribes the status of “foreign states”
by observing that “any attempt
[by foreign nations] to acquire
their lands, or to form a political
connexion with them, would be
considered by all as an invasion
of our territory, and an act of hostility”). Although the earlier case
of Johnson v. M’Intosh purported
to ground its denial of the power
of Indian tribes to alienate tribal
property in the European doctrine
of “discovery,” see 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823), Cherokee
Nation’s subsequent clarification of
Johnson’s holding indicates that the
real justification for denying tribes
the power to alienate their lands
was the Court’s concern about the
implications of such power for undermining the territorial security
of the United States. The Marshall
Court’s progression from a potentially limitless “discovery”-type
rationale to a very restrictive “national security”–type rationale for
finding a limitation on the scope
of inherent tribal sovereignty is
reflected in the Court’s recurring
doubts about the legal and moral
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validity of the European “discovery” doctrine, which the Court ultimately found applicable to Indian
law disputes only when “glanc[ing]
at [the] origins” of colonization
and not when “proceed[ing] . . . to
the actual state of things,” Worcester,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543. See, e.g.,
id. (disparaging the “proposition”
of “discovery” as “difficult to comprehend”); Johnson, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) at 591 (denigrating the
“discovery” theory as an “extravagant . . . pretension” that “may be
opposed to natural right, and to
the usages of civilized nations”).
24 See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
at 556–57 (“From the commencement of our government, congress
has passed acts to regulate trade
and intercourse with the Indians;
which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a
firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate.”);
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at
17 (“[Indian tribes] acknowledge
themselves in their treaties to
be under the protection of the
United States. . . . They look to
our government for protection.”).
25 See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
at 560 (adverting to “the universal
conviction that . . . [Indian nations’] territory was separated
from that of any state within
whose chartered limits they might
reside, by a boundary line, established by treaties: that, within
their boundary, they possessed
rights with which no state could
interfere”).
26 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886)
(upholding congressional power
to enact the Major Crimes Act of
1885).
27 Id. at 384.
28 See id. at 378–79 (declining to
identify the Indian Commerce
Clause as the source of congressional power to enact the Major
Crimes Act); id. at 384–85 (de-

30 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
31 See id. at 564.
32 Id. at 566, 568.
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33 See, e.g., United States v. Sioux
Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980)
(noting that Lone Wolf ’s position,
that an Indian affairs dispute is
strictly a “political matter, not
amenable to judicial review . . .,
has long since been discredited
in takings cases”).
34 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 15, at
231 (footnote omitted) (quoting
United States v.Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
322–23 (1978)).
35 See, e.g., Frank Pommersheim,
“Our Federalism” in the Context of
Federal Courts and Tribal Courts:
An Open Letter to the Federal Courts’
Teaching and Scholarly Community,
71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 123 (2000);
Philip S. Frickey, A Common Law for
Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority
Over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L. J. 1
(1999); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in
Indian Law, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1573
(1996); Ralph W. Johnson and
Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 Pub.
Land L. Rev. 1 (1995); Judith V.
Royster, The Legacy of Allotment,
27 Ariz. St. L. J. 1 (1995).
36 118 U.S. 375 (1886). See supra
notes 26–29 and accompanying
text.
37 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
38 Id. at 206.
39 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
326 (1978) (adverting to Oliphant’s
holding in discussing “[t]he areas
in which . . . implicit divestiture of
[tribal] sovereignty has been held
to have occurred”).
40 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (quoting
Oliphant v. Schiele, 544 F. 2d
1007, 1009 (1976) (decision
below) (emphasis added by the
Supreme Court)).
41 Id. at 203, 208–12.
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29 See id. at 379 (stating that Cherokee
Nation “held that the Cherokees
were not a State or nation within
the meaning of the Constitution”);
id. at 382 (stating that in Cherokee
Nation, “it was held that these
tribes were neither States nor
nations”). But see Cherokee Nation,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16 (“The acts of
our government plainly recognize
the Cherokee nation as a state,
and the courts are bound by those
acts.”). See also Kagama, 118 U.S.
at 381–82 (stating that Indian
tribes have a status under federal
law “not as nations, . . . but as
a separate people”); id. at 379
(“The soil and the people within
[the geographical] limits [of the
United States] are under the political control of the Government
of the United States, or of the
States of the Union. There exist
within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two.”). But see
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 555
(observing that under a treaty
with the Cherokee Nation, “[a]
boundary is described, between
nation and nation, by mutual consent. The national character of
each . . . is acknowledged by the
other. . . . This treaty . . . explicitly recogniz[es] the national character of the Cherokees.”); id. at
559–60 (“We have applied [the
words ‘treaty’ and ‘nation’] to
Indians, as we have applied them
to the other nations of the earth.
They are applied to all in the same
sense.”).
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claring that power over Indians
“must exist in [the federal] government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the
theatre of its exercise is within the
geographical limits of the United
States, because it has never been
denied, and because it alone can
enforce its law on all the tribes”).
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42 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990).
43 Id. at 688.
44 Id. at 685.
45 See supra note 23.
46 See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (directing that the term “ ‘powers of selfgovernment’ . . . means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians”).
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47 Joint Explanatory Statement of
the Committee on Conference,
H.R. Rep. No. 102-261, at 3
(1991), reprinted in 137 Cong. Rec.
27,041 (1991).
48 Limited intrusions on tribes’ inherent powers of criminal jurisdiction
also resulted from enactment of
Public Law 280 in 1953 and the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) in
1968. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953,
ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1360, 1360 note); 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302. In two important decisions
of the modern era, the Supreme
Court narrowly construed these
statutes to minimize their deleterious impacts on tribal sovereignty.
See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S.
373 (1976) (narrowly construing
Public Law 280); Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)
(narrowly construing ICRA); see
also Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 15,
at 243–44 (discussing Bryan and
Martinez); infra text accompanying
notes 56–58 (discussing Martinez).
49 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland,
508 U.S. 679 (1993) (purporting
to discern congressional intent to
divest Tribe of power to regulate
hunting and fishing by nonmembers in statue taking reservation
lands for federal dam project but
silent on tribal regulatory jurisdiction, and refusing to consider
whether such jurisdiction is re-
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tained under Montana’s exceptions
to “implicit divestiture” of tribal
sovereignty); Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding, inter alia, that Indian tribes
have no inherent legislative power
to regulate the conduct of nonIndians on non-Indian fee lands
within reservation boundaries
unless such regulation addresses
“activities of nonmembers who
enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members” or
that “threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe”);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980) (upholding a state tax
on cigarette sales to non-Indians
at on-reservation smokeshops,
and an ancillary requirement that
smokeshop operators keep detailed sales records for the state,
as not impermissibly invasive of
inherent tribal legislative power).
50 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
51 Id. at 219, 223.
52 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
53 Id. at 383.
54 Id. at 386–88.
55 Id. at 389.
56 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
57 See id. at 72.
58 Id. at 64–65 (citations and footnotes omitted).
59 471 U.S. 844 (1985).
60 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
61 See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at
856–57.
62 Id. at 855–56 (footnotes omitted).
63 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
64 See id. at 16.

67 Id. at 442.
68 See id. at 445–53.
69 Id. at 445.
70 See 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)
(“[E]xercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of
the tribes, and so cannot survive
without express congressional
delegation.”).
71 Id. at 565, quoted in Strate, 520
U.S. at 445–46.
72 See Strate, 520 U.S. at 454–56.
73 Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66,
quoted in Strate, 520 U.S. at
456–57.
74 Strate, 520 U.S. at 457 (quoting
A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F. 3d
930, 940 (1996) (decision below)).
75 Id. at 457–58.
76 Id. at 459.
77 Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217, 220 (1959)).
78 Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S.
191, 206 (1978); supra text accompanying note 38.
79 See supra text accompanying
notes 50–65.
80 Under Article III of the United
States Constitution, federal judicial power extends only to “Cases”
and “Controversies,” U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Strate was a “Case”
strictly about the power of tribal
courts to adjudicate a civil dispute
among non-Indians only. See Strate,
520 U.S. at 443 (“Neither [tribal
court plaintiff] nor [tribal court
defendant] is . . . an Indian.”).
Because there was no “Case” or
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“Controversy” in the Strate litigation implicating tribes’ inherent
power to adjudicate civil claims
involving nonmember Indians, the
federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, lacked constitutional power to render a decision
in the case limiting tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. The
Strate Court’s use of the term “nonmembers” in attempting to state
the case’s holding therefore must
be interpreted strictly to mean
“non-Indian nonmembers” to avoid
the obvious constitutional problem of a federal court purporting
to decide a legal issue not before
the court in the “Case” at bar.
81 See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2). Although § 1301(2) expressly recognizes and affirms tribes’ inherent powers “to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians,” id.
(emphasis added), in legislatively
overriding Duro, Congress effectively displaced the Court’s misguided views relating generally to
the historic and ongoing exercise
of inherent tribal authority over
“all Indians.” This, in turn, suggests that in addition to the constitutionality question noted supra
at note 80 and accompanying
text, the Strate Court was without
power to exhume—even in a case
addressing tribes’ inherent civil
powers—Duro’s erroneous rationale for finding inherent tribal authority over nonmember Indians
“implicitly divested” after Congress
overrode that rationale with a
statute in derogation of the Court’s
common law judgment in 1991.
82 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990). For a
discussion of Duro and its aftermath, see supra notes 42–47 and
accompanying text.
83 See supra text accompanying notes
50–65.
84 See Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (“Subject to controlling provisions in
treaties and statutes, and the two
exceptions identified in Montana,
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66 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997).
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65 Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
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the civil authority of Indian tribes
and their courts with respect to
non-Indian fee lands generally
‘do[es] not extend to the activities
of nonmembers of the tribe.’ ”)
(alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
85 See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
86 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
87 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 15, at
27 (footnotes omitted).
88 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
89 Id. at 456 (reprinting Act of
March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1035, as
appendix to opinion of the Court);
see also id. at 427–28 (holding
“that the 1891 Act terminated the
Lake Traverse Reservation”).
90 Id. at 461 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 447.
92 Id. at 464 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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93 Id. at 466 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
94 See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux
Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (diminishing the Yankton Sioux Reservation); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399
(1994) (diminishing the Uintah
Valley Reservation); Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Kneip (1977) (diminishing
the Rosebud Reservation). In only
one diminishment/disestablishment case decided since DeCoteau
did the Supreme Court conclude
that an Indian reservation’s
boundaries were unaffected by
a “surplus land” statute alleged
to have altered those boundaries.
See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463
(1983) (holding that the Cheyenne River Act of 1908 did not diminish the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation in South Dakota).
However, despite the correctness
of its holding, the Solem Court in
dicta exacerbated the diminishment/disestablishment doctrine
by forging a judicial license to
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consider factors unrelated to the
meaning of the particular statute
in reaching the conclusion that an
Indian reservation has been “de
facto” diminished. See id. at 463
(“On a more pragmatic level, we
have recognized that who actually
moves onto opened reservation
lands is also relevant to deciding
whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation. Where nonIndian settlers flooded into the
opened portion of a reservation
and the area has long since lost
its Indian character, we have acknowledged that de facto, if not
de jure, diminishment may have
occurred.”).
95 See supra text following note 87;
see also Cohen’s Handbook, supra
note 15, at 221 (“Since Congress
is exercising a trust responsibility
when dealing with Indians, courts
presume that Congress’ intent toward them is benevolent and have
developed canons of construction
that treaties and other federal action should when possible be read
as protecting Indian rights and in
a manner favorable to Indians.”).
96 510 U.S. at 424 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
97 In the recent case of Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie Tribal Government,
522 U.S. 520 (1998), the Supreme
Court expanded its anti-tribal
methodology of statutory interpretation beyond the context of
the diminishment/disestablishment of Indian reservations. In
Venetie, the Court addressed the
question of whether 44 million
acres of land in Alaska secured to
Alaska Natives by the 1971 Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA) constitute “Indian
country” by virtue of Congress’s
statutory inclusion of “dependent
Indian communities” within the
meaning of “Indian country,” 18
U.S.C. § 1151(b); see supra text
accompanying note 86. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth

99 See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438, 448-53 (1997) (validating tribal court exhaustion requirement as “a prudential rule”
(quoting Iowa Mutual Insurance Co.
v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 20 n.14
(1987))).
100 National Farmers Union Insurance Cos.
v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856–57
(1985) (footnotes omitted).
101 Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16–17
(citations omitted) (quoting National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857).
102 Strate, 520 U.S. at 450 (citation
omitted) (quoting Iowa Mutual,
480 U.S. at 857) (alteration made
by Strate).
103 See id. at 448 (“Both [National
Farmers and Iowa Mutual] describe
an exhaustion rule allowing tribal
courts initially to respond to an
invocation of their jurisdiction;
neither establishes tribal-court adjudicatory authority, even over the
lawsuits involved in those cases.”);
see also supra notes 68–70 and
accompanying text.
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104 National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856;
supra text accompanying note 100.
105 526 U.S. 473 (1999).
106 See id. at 476–79. As used here,
the abbreviation “nuclear tort”
refers to the Price-Anderson Act’s
conversion to a federal cause of
action of “any legal liability arising
out of or resulting from a nuclear
incident or precautionary evacuation.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w), quoted in Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 476.
107 See Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 478,
482–83 & nn.4–5
108 See id. at 476, 485, 487–88.
109 Id. at 484 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
2210(n)(2).
110 Id. at 485 n.7.
111 Id. at 485–86 n.7 (citation omitted).
112 Id. at 483.
113 Id. at 486.
114 Id. at 484.
115 National Farmers Union Insurance Cos.
v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856–57
(1985); supra text accompanying
note 100.
116 Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 487. Justice
Souter, writing for the unanimous
Neztsosie Court, made this enigmatic statement in explaining the
Court’s decision to ignore the
conventional textual canon of
construction expressio unius est excusio
alterius—“expression of one thing
shows the exclusion of others”—
in concluding that the PriceAnderson Act’s express provision
of removal from state courts does
not imply that Congress intended
to leave the jurisdiction of tribal
courts unaffected. See id. However, the statement also implies a
complete disregard of Congress’s
general solicitude for Indian rights
in the Court’s interpretation of the
act’s silence on tribal courts.
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98 See supra notes 59–82 and accompanying text.
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Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision
that the land in question is Indian
country, rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s use of a balancing test protective of Indian rights in interpreting the meaning of the statutory
term “dependent Indian communities” and adopting instead the
view that by enacting ANCSA,
Congress intended to leave the
tribes of Alaska “ ‘sovereigns without territorial reach.’ ” Venetie, 522
U.S. at 523, 525–26, 531–32 n.7
(quoting Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Government v. Alaska, 101 F.3d
1286, 1303 (1996) (case below)
(Fernandez, J., dissenting)). The
Venetie decision is, of course, additional evidence of the Supreme
Court’s antitribal activism in statutory construction bearing on the
meaning of “Indian country.”
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117 Cf. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v.
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987)
(“Civil jurisdiction over . . . activities [of non-Indians on reservation
lands] presumptively lies in the
tribal courts unless affirmatively
limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute.”); supra
text accompanying note 65.
118 A surprisingly encouraging remark appears in a footnote to the
unanimous Neztsosie opinion. After
explaining why the Ninth Circuit
for “institutional” reasons should
not have addressed the merits of
the district court’s nonappealed
holding that the Navajo Tribal
Courts had no subject matter jurisdiction over Price-Anderson
Act claims, see Neztsosie, 526 U.S.
at 479–82, the Supreme Court
nevertheless cast doubt on the assumption that a deprival of tribal
court jurisdiction could be justified
on the basis of Strate: “Strate dealt
with claims against nonmembers
arising on state highways, and ‘express[ed] no view on the governing law or proper forum when an
accident occurs on a tribal road
within a reservation.’ By contrast,
the events in question here occurred on tribal lands.” Id. at 482
n.4 (citations omitted) (quoting
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S.
438, 442 (1997) (alteration in
original). Although this comment
suggests that the Court would not
expand Strate to find tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over PriceAnderson Act claims “implicitly
divested,” a further dictum implies
that the Court might find tribal
jurisdiction divested on the basis
of some other theory: “[O]ur view
of the inappropriateness of applying tribal exhaustion suggests
that, notwithstanding the silence
of the Price-Anderson Act with
respect to tribal courts, the exercise of tribal jurisdiction over
claims found to fall within the
Act once a defendant has sought
a federal forum would be anoma-
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lous at best.” Id. at 483 n.5 (citation omitted).
119 Tribal courts must enforce federal
court judgments pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution. See U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
120 This presumes, of course, that the
particular tribal court has been
granted tribal authority to enact
such rules.
121 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999) (holding that Congress
has no power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity by making
states answer federal-question suits
in state courts); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (holding that suits brought by Indian
tribes against state officials alleging violations of tribes’ federally
protected rights to on-reservation
submerged lands and seeking only
prospective relief nevertheless do
not qualify for federal court jurisdiction pursuant to the Ex parte
Young exception to state sovereign
immunity); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that
Congress has no power under
Article I of the Constitution to abrogate state sovereign immunity
by making states answer federalquestion suits in federal court, including suits brought by Indian
tribes to vindicate the tribes’ federally protected rights).
122 See the following sections: “Great
Sioux Nation Law and Culture
Journal,” “Great Sioux Nation
Legislative Drafting Project,”
Great Sioux Nation Constitution
Revision Project,” and “Great
Sioux Nation Law and Economic
Development Project.”
123 See Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576,
§ 17, 48 Stat. 988 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 477).
124 See the section “Jurisdiction.”

